May 28, 2009
Beijing weighs its options
By Jing-dong Yuan
MONTEREY, California - Beijing responded to North Korea's latest nuclear test on Monday with a strong statement decrying Pyongyang's disregard for the common goals of the international community and making clear the Chinese government's "resolute opposition" to the test.
"China strongly demands that North Korea keep its promise of denuclearization and cease all actions that could further worsen the situation," the Foreign Ministry statement said.
North Korea's nuclear test followed last month's launch of a long-range missile and a steady escalation of tensions on the peninsular. After the launch and subsequent international criticism, North Korea announced it was expelling nuclear inspectors, scrapping inter-Korean agreements and would "never" return to the six-party talks. The talks involve China, the United States, South Korean, Russia and Japan, and are aimed at dismantling the North's nuclear weapons program.
Pyongyang's defiant nuclear test has drawn further international condemnation. The United Nations Security Council moved quickly to call an emergency meeting which described the test as a clear violation of UN Resolution 1718, which prohibits the reclusive communist state from exploding a nuclear weapon. It is expected that the council will decide on further action in the coming days.
The nuclear test is another major setback for the international community, and in particular the six-party talks, which began in August 2003. As the host of this multilateral negotiation process, and a country with important stakes in the stability of the region, China now faces major challenges. How to balance its response to the test, while keeping in mind its longer-term security interests, will be an important test of Beijing's diplomatic skills.
China's involvement in efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear issue coincided with three phases of events. The first phase, between North Korea's first announcement of nuclear plans in October 2002 and Beijing's hosting of the first trilateral meeting between China, North Korea and the United States in April 2003, saw a China reluctant to take up any active role in defusing the crisis. Beijing argued that Pyongyang and Washington should find ways to resolve their disputes and to return to the agreed framework.
However, the George W Bush administration's refusal to engage in direct bilateral dialogue with North Korea, Pyongyang's withdrawal from the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and its reactivation of the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, raised the stakes and convinced China that it had to step in and defuse the situation.
The second phase began with the initiation of the six-party talks in August 2003 and ran through October 2007 when the six parties - the two Koreas, the US, Japan, China and Russia - agreed on a nuclear disablement plan. China played an active role not only as an impartial host but also an engaged and skillful negotiator at each critical juncture of the bumpy negotiation process. A joint statement made on September 19, 2005, and the action plan of February 13, 2007 laid out a road map for the eventual nuclear disarmament on the peninsular, and Beijing's tireless efforts received well-deserved respect.
The change of government in South Korea in early 2008 ushered in the third phase. The new Lee Myung-bak administration abandoned the reconciliatory Sunshine policy of its predecessor and demanded reciprocity in inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang reacted strongly to what it saw as a hostile policy from the South. Major disputes also emerged between Pyongyang and Washington over nuclear disablement and verification issues, and North Korea began in late 2008 to significantly slow the de-nuclearization process.
North Korea's latest nuclear test has now again put China on the spot. As the UN Security Council deliberates its response and action in the coming weeks, whether Beijing would agree to new and tougher sanctions has already become a question of intense debate and speculation. There is also renewed focus on if and how China can use its leverage to exert pressure on Pyongyang.
These are understandable - albeit for some unrealistic and even unreasonable - expectations. Indeed, China has become North Korea's largest partner in trade and investment, averaging US$2 billion annually in recent years and China provides the North with significant energy and food supplies. Given that China supports a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, there is ample reason to believe that Beijing expects Pyongyang to respect that position. But so far events have proven otherwise. Where is Beijing's leverage and why is it not willing to use it?
Looking at China's positions on the North Korean nuclear issue over the years, one can summarize that they consistently emphasize three core elements: denuclearization, peninsular peace and stability, and resolution through diplomacy and dialogue. Beijing views North Korea's nuclear program as a symptom, not a cause, of insecurity and instability in the region. Any action that further aggravates the situation will not help solve but can only escalate nuclear tension. This is why the Chinese government has called on all parties involved to "respond in a calm and appropriate manner and persist in solving the problems through consultations and dialogue".
Clearly, the issue is not whether China has the leverage and the willingness to use it against North Korea; it is the calculation of what impacts on what specific goals such pressure would generate. China has over the past six years selectively used such pressure to good effect without completely losing influence, however limited it may be. Beijing has already concluded, as have many others, that the key to solving this problem remains direct dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington.
China views stability on the Korean Peninsula as essential for its near to mid-term strategic objectives, continued economic development, domestic stability and international standing, as each requires a peaceful regional security environment. For this reason alone, it can be expected that Beijing will endorse condemnation of North Korea's behavior and limited but not severe sanctions that could seriously undermine its interests. But getting to that point depends on how skillful the Chinese diplomacy is in the corridors of the United Nations Security Council.
Dr Jing-dong Yuan is director of East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, and an associate professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29992.1
Sunday, May 31, 2009
China says 'no thanks' to G-2
May 29, 2009
China says 'no thanks' to G-2
By Jian Junbo
SHANGHAI - At the Sino-European Union (EU) summit in Prague last week, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao rejected the concept of a Group of Two (G-2) comprising China and the United States, saying "it is totally ungrounded and wrong to talk about the dominance of two countries in international affairs".
It was the first time a Chinese leader has publicly commented on the notion of a G-2, though Wen and a number of Chinese officials and think-tanks had cast doubt on the practicability of past notions of a "Chimerica".
The idea of a G-2 was first forwarded by US academic circles in 2006, but it was raised again by Zbigniew Brzezinski, an influential specialist in international relations and national security advisor to former US president Jimmy Carter, in Beijing in January as the two countries celebrated the 30th anniversary of establishing formal diplomatic ties.
Similar to "Chimerica", which would put the US and China at the forefront of international affairs, the idea of a G-2 grouping has attracted wide attention, especially as Brzezinski was an advisor to President Barack Obama during the presidential elections.
In the Group of 20 (G-20) summit in London last month, the G-2 was floated again in the Western media and academic circles. Then after several weeks, on the eve of this month's just-concluded 11th Sino-EU summit, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband predicted that over the next few decades, China would become one of the two "powers that count".
He said, "China was becoming an indispensable power in the 21st century in the way [former US secretary of state] Madeleine Albright said the US was an indispensable power at the end of the last century". He also argued it would be up to Europe if it wanted to change the G-2 into a G-3.
While widely discussed, the concept of a G-2 has not been clearly defined. According to Brzezinski, G-2 described the current reality, yet for Miliband, G-2 was a possibility in the foreseeable future.
The exact structure of the proposed G-2 is also unclear. A G-2 would seem to imply that the group would have the strength, capability and will to set the agenda for international affairs. It could be argued, as only two countries are involved, that this would resemble world hegemony.
China has neither the capacity nor the desire to become a member of a G-2. It is true that China has the world's third-largest economy, is the biggest creditor to the world's sole superpower - the United States, and is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security council, and China indeed seems a big power.
However, with its huge population and wealth and development gaps, China can also be seen as a poor, underdeveloped country - its per capita GDP was ranked 104th globally last year by the World Bank. China is still a developing country, and by comparison the US is far more advanced in almost all economic sectors and in soft power and military strength. At this stage and in the foreseeable future, there is no match between China and the US in terms of overall strength.
The responsibility of a G-2 member to jointly shape the world's economy and international affairs is too far beyond China's ability and ambitions. It is unwise for a country, like a person, to commit itself to something beyond its ability. That is why when Western commentators discuss the G-2, China is inevitably suspicious of their intentions. Many Chinese scholars fear that under a G-2, China could be enmeshed into a structure built by the US, and required to make more contributions to world economic and social development than it can afford.
A G-2 would also imply a need for China to overhaul domestic governance. As a member of G-2, China would need to be a leader in both foreign and internal affairs, and this has raised fears of Western intervention in China's domestic affairs.
The grouping also goes against core principles of China's foreign policy such as multilateralism and the desire for a multipolar world order. For example, Wen stressed on at the Prague Sino-EU summit the importance of China's relations with the EU.
Another major reason for China to reject a G-2 is that it is would not be legitimate international structure. If G-2 was built with the help of the US, then the question is who can empower or authorize the US to do that? We can imagine the G-2 would be refused by most countries if taken to a global referendum. No other country, except for US, wants to see the emergence of "pax-Chimericana". The rejection of a G-2 does not mean China will shirk its global responsibilities. China has welcomed the increased role it and other big developing countries enjoy through the G-20 framework.
Even if a G-2 became a reality, it could never replace the power, function and authority of the UN as the sole international organization recognized by the majority of states in the world. Although there are many problems that the UN faces in regard to its effectiveness and accountability, it is still the best platform for the international community to peacefully deal with issues of common interest.
As the US became the target of anti-Americanism in the world after former president George W Bush started the Iraq war in 2003, G-2 one day could also be the target of anti-hegemony or anti-imperialist movements, affecting China's global image.
Another reason is related to the rise of civil society as an increasingly important factor in international governance, especially since the end of the Cold War. Without the participation of transnational non-government organizations (NGOs), many international issues can not be resolved successfully. Yet if G-2 was accountable for international governance it could be a threat to global civil society because as a hegemonic structure it could limit the function and ability of other actors including other countries, the UN and lots of NGOs.
It is self evident that a G-2 would not be good for other countries and powers, especially rising industrial stars like India, Russia and Brazil. All of these nations have the ambition to compete for influence and power with both US and China in the international arena. The idea of a G-2 is based neither upon the realities of international politics nor on the willingness of China and the rest of the world.
Dr Jian Junbo is assistant professor of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, China.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29991.1
China says 'no thanks' to G-2
By Jian Junbo
SHANGHAI - At the Sino-European Union (EU) summit in Prague last week, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao rejected the concept of a Group of Two (G-2) comprising China and the United States, saying "it is totally ungrounded and wrong to talk about the dominance of two countries in international affairs".
It was the first time a Chinese leader has publicly commented on the notion of a G-2, though Wen and a number of Chinese officials and think-tanks had cast doubt on the practicability of past notions of a "Chimerica".
The idea of a G-2 was first forwarded by US academic circles in 2006, but it was raised again by Zbigniew Brzezinski, an influential specialist in international relations and national security advisor to former US president Jimmy Carter, in Beijing in January as the two countries celebrated the 30th anniversary of establishing formal diplomatic ties.
Similar to "Chimerica", which would put the US and China at the forefront of international affairs, the idea of a G-2 grouping has attracted wide attention, especially as Brzezinski was an advisor to President Barack Obama during the presidential elections.
In the Group of 20 (G-20) summit in London last month, the G-2 was floated again in the Western media and academic circles. Then after several weeks, on the eve of this month's just-concluded 11th Sino-EU summit, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband predicted that over the next few decades, China would become one of the two "powers that count".
He said, "China was becoming an indispensable power in the 21st century in the way [former US secretary of state] Madeleine Albright said the US was an indispensable power at the end of the last century". He also argued it would be up to Europe if it wanted to change the G-2 into a G-3.
While widely discussed, the concept of a G-2 has not been clearly defined. According to Brzezinski, G-2 described the current reality, yet for Miliband, G-2 was a possibility in the foreseeable future.
The exact structure of the proposed G-2 is also unclear. A G-2 would seem to imply that the group would have the strength, capability and will to set the agenda for international affairs. It could be argued, as only two countries are involved, that this would resemble world hegemony.
China has neither the capacity nor the desire to become a member of a G-2. It is true that China has the world's third-largest economy, is the biggest creditor to the world's sole superpower - the United States, and is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security council, and China indeed seems a big power.
However, with its huge population and wealth and development gaps, China can also be seen as a poor, underdeveloped country - its per capita GDP was ranked 104th globally last year by the World Bank. China is still a developing country, and by comparison the US is far more advanced in almost all economic sectors and in soft power and military strength. At this stage and in the foreseeable future, there is no match between China and the US in terms of overall strength.
The responsibility of a G-2 member to jointly shape the world's economy and international affairs is too far beyond China's ability and ambitions. It is unwise for a country, like a person, to commit itself to something beyond its ability. That is why when Western commentators discuss the G-2, China is inevitably suspicious of their intentions. Many Chinese scholars fear that under a G-2, China could be enmeshed into a structure built by the US, and required to make more contributions to world economic and social development than it can afford.
A G-2 would also imply a need for China to overhaul domestic governance. As a member of G-2, China would need to be a leader in both foreign and internal affairs, and this has raised fears of Western intervention in China's domestic affairs.
The grouping also goes against core principles of China's foreign policy such as multilateralism and the desire for a multipolar world order. For example, Wen stressed on at the Prague Sino-EU summit the importance of China's relations with the EU.
Another major reason for China to reject a G-2 is that it is would not be legitimate international structure. If G-2 was built with the help of the US, then the question is who can empower or authorize the US to do that? We can imagine the G-2 would be refused by most countries if taken to a global referendum. No other country, except for US, wants to see the emergence of "pax-Chimericana". The rejection of a G-2 does not mean China will shirk its global responsibilities. China has welcomed the increased role it and other big developing countries enjoy through the G-20 framework.
Even if a G-2 became a reality, it could never replace the power, function and authority of the UN as the sole international organization recognized by the majority of states in the world. Although there are many problems that the UN faces in regard to its effectiveness and accountability, it is still the best platform for the international community to peacefully deal with issues of common interest.
As the US became the target of anti-Americanism in the world after former president George W Bush started the Iraq war in 2003, G-2 one day could also be the target of anti-hegemony or anti-imperialist movements, affecting China's global image.
Another reason is related to the rise of civil society as an increasingly important factor in international governance, especially since the end of the Cold War. Without the participation of transnational non-government organizations (NGOs), many international issues can not be resolved successfully. Yet if G-2 was accountable for international governance it could be a threat to global civil society because as a hegemonic structure it could limit the function and ability of other actors including other countries, the UN and lots of NGOs.
It is self evident that a G-2 would not be good for other countries and powers, especially rising industrial stars like India, Russia and Brazil. All of these nations have the ambition to compete for influence and power with both US and China in the international arena. The idea of a G-2 is based neither upon the realities of international politics nor on the willingness of China and the rest of the world.
Dr Jian Junbo is assistant professor of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, China.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29991.1
NHG's employee sceptical of Dr Vivian’s calls for a ‘fair and dignified’ outcome in the 2nd STTA fiasco
Singaporeans sceptical of Dr Vivian’s calls for a ‘fair and dignified’ outcome in the 2nd STTA fiasco
Three weeks after the eruption of the 2nd ping pong controversy which was sparked by STTA President Lee Bee Wah’s remarks about ex-coach Liu Guodong lacking “professionalism and integrity”, Dr Vivian Balakrishnan has finally revealed his stance on the matter.
While there were calls for him to intervene to resolve the matter like what happened last year, Dr Vivian ruled out intervention by his ministry. He urged all sides involved to aim for a ‘fair and dignified’ outcome.
The ministry’s Senior Parliamentary Secretary Teo Ser Luck also said he was happy with progress made so far and hoped the dispute would not end in legal action.
The ministry’s half-hearted and lacklustre replies did not come down well with ordinary Singaporeans who continue to clamor for Lee Bee Wah’s resignation.
In less a day, the online petition set up to call for Lee’s removal from STTA saw an increase of almost 200 signatures lampooning Lee as well as Dr Vivian and Teo Ser Luck.
Singaporeans are adamant that Lee Bee Wah apologized to the coach.
Wrote Lim Chai Ju:
| Lim Chai Ju | By calling for dignified outcome, does Dr VB mean to ask the Singaporeans be less opposing, compromise and settle somewhere in between, therefore not insisting for an apology from LBW? So that she can continue to flex her wings again in the future? |
Tan Kien Tung was sceptical of Dr Vivian’s definition of a “dignified” outcome:
| Tan Kien Tung | Dignified could simply mean to settle without asking the STTA president to apologise nor admit anything wrong doing (give chance lah!), then just move on and close the file, this is what is implied. Too simplistic really, you see, Singaporeans are being treated like fools, time and again |
Patrick Tong felt it was Lee who treated Liu unfairly in the first place.
| Patrick Tong | Doc is urging all sides involved to aim for a “fair and dignified” outcome, so what is fair and dignified? Was here any fairness when LBW made Liu to leave last year, and not nominating him this year, is this so-called fairnss? What has Doc said? |
Tan Boon Liong was equally scathing in his remarks:
| Tan Boon Liong | What is dignity to STTA? Scheming a concerted effort to push someone off the cliff to satisfy one single person, the power that be? |
Yong Siew Look took issue with Teo Ser Luck’s response:
| Yong Siew Look | I think Teo SL has different definition of happiness. He said he was happy with the progress, but not sure if he is happy with LBW, actually happy can mean so many things in life, just like some students say they are happy with their test result of 15 marks, fail badly yet happy? May be. |
Another netizen lambasted Dr Vivian’s comment that the profile of the sports was raised by the saga:
| Profile raised.. | ” the fact that ppl can be bothered, that ppl are worked up, shows ppl are paying interest and care . …. that reflects the fact that the profile of sport has been raised…” SO are u saying it is good thing afterall …..THAT COACH LGD ’s BEEN FORCED OUT OF SPORE, REPUTATION TARNISHED WHILE LEEBWAH WENT INTO HIDING WHEN CONFRONTED BY LGD?! AND TIS RAISES THE PROFILE OF LITTLE RED DOT? GEE , U SURE HAVE A WEIRD SENSE OF HUMOUR ! |
From the comments posted on the petition, it appeared that Singaporeans are really peeved off with the way Lee Bee Wah and STTA had conducted themselves.
Despite attempts by the media to play down the dispute and salvage the reputation of the embattled Lee, Singaporeans remained sceptical about the “fair and dignified” outcome hoped for by Dr Vivian.
The public fury shows no signs of abating and to some Singaporeans, nothing less than Lee’s departure will placate them.
Though Lee had now expressed willingness to meet Liu in person, Liu is unable to come to Singapore in the near future due to work committments.
How long more will this fiasco rumble on? Will Singaporeans still remember it after two months? What “deal” will STTA make with Liu Guodong under the table to save the “face” for Lee Bee Wah?
Besides Dr Vivian and Teo, Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong and ex-STTA President Yeo Guat Kwang had also commented on the saga. Goh felt the matter was not handled properly while Yeo called on STTA to account to the public as soon as possible.
In spite of increasing public pressure for STTA to explain its actions, it has wilfully refused to do so. Perhaps in the eyes of STTA, a “fair and dignified” outcome means ensuring its President get away scot-free for her words without needing to substantiate them while keeping Liu as far away as possible from Singapore and quietly praying that Singaporeans will soon forget about the entire episode altogether.
Regardless of the outcome, Lee Bee Wah has lost all moral authority to remain as President of STTA.
Please sign on the two online petitions if you haven’t done so:
1. Petition to DPM Teo Chee Hean to give special award to Liu Guodong
2. Petition to remove Lee Bee Wah as STTA President
Turn up at Hong Lim Park on 6 June 2009 between 5pm to 6.30pm to sign the petition calling for her removal as STTA President.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=28588.74
NHG employee's diatribe on Lee Bee Wah getting nowhere
Where is STTA’s “fairness and dignity” when its President made damaging remarks about Liu without substantiating it?
Dr Vivian Balakrishnan urged all sides involved in the ongoing dispute between STTA and Liu Guodong to aim for a ‘fair and dignified’ outcome. (read article here)
What “fair and dignified” outcome is Dr Vivian hoping for after all the damage that STTA has inflicted on a coach who brought back Singapore’s first Olympic silver medal in 48 years?
Let me borrow this analogy posted by a netizen on the petition to remove Lee Bee Wah as STTA President:
“The tennis game analogy is lame, how about this, I punch you on your face (outburst during Olympics), followed by a round horse slap to the back of your head (not nominating you for the ‘Coach of the year award’), followed by a final kick to your groin (character assault), after that you still struggle to stand up amid great pain, walk up to me and ask why I hit you, I go and hide in one corner. After a while, showing no remorse, I go back to you and ask you, come, let’s have a fair and dignified ending……ARE YOU JOKING OR WHAT? Think about this, if the reverse was carried out by Liu to LBW, will all the relevant leaders still say the same thing, let’s have a fair and dignified outcome?”
Where is the fairness of STTA and Lee Bee Wah when they refuse to nominate Liu Guodong for the “Coach of the year” award without giving any explanations?
Where is their fairness when Lee made a public remark casting aspersions on Liu’s professionalism and integrity without substantiating her allegations?
Where is Lee Bee Wah’s dignity when she went hiding and refused to meet Liu in person after he flew all the way from Beijing to Singapore to seek clarifications for her words?
Where is STTA’s dignity when they sent two officials to meet Liu with the intention of deceiving him to sign an English document which he can’t read or understand to absolve Lee Bee Wah from all legal liabilities?
And does Singaporeans have any dignity left after Lee Bee Wah single-handedly shamed the entire nation with her attitude, conduct and behavior? Where is her PROFESSIONALISM and INTEGRITY???
Teo Ser Luck still got the cheek to say that he is “happy” that “progress” has been made! Is there any “progress” other than the relentless media spin and propaganda to defuse public anger and to obsfuscate the entire matter?
The media is now protraying Liu Guodong as a sore loser who took issue with STTA for not nominating him for the award when it was Lee Bee Wah who started the fiasco with her careless and insensitive words.
Had she been more tactful and diplomatic enough, she would have declined offering her views and instead ask the media to wake for an official statement from STTA.
Now that she had jumped the gun and claimed that Liu Guodong was not nominated for the award due to lack of “professionalism and integrity” on his part, we can never be sure if this was really the reason behind STTA’s refusal to nominate him in the first place.
Straits Times Editor Han Fook Kwang, in the defending his paper from critics that it was biased towards the Aware old guards, wrote:
“Our internal processes, which involve several layers of editing and gate-keeping, ensure that individual reporters do not push their own agendas.” (read article here)
Mr Han, can you please explain how your “internal processes” fail to detect the blatant intellectual dishonesty of your reporters to distort the truth beyond recognition to save the skin of Lee Bee Wah? What agenda are you pushing here?
There can only be one fair and dignified outcome in this matter to prevent it from going to courts: Lee Bee Wah retracts her statements, issue an unreserved public apology to Liu Guodong and resign from STTA to take personal responsiblity for bringing disrepute to STTA.
Lianhe Wanbao reported that Lee Bee Wah is now agreeable to meeting Liu in person. What is the purpose of the meeting? Ask Liu to forget about the matter and leave Singapore for good?
Lee Bee Wah is an adult. As a public figure and MP, she should know how much damage her words can inflict on the reputation of Liu Guodong or anybody else. She is impugning on another person’s character which can be taken to mean that he is are dishonest, untrustworthy, unprincipled, corrupt and unethical.
What did Liu do to deserve such a testimony from his superior? Did he slack on his job, steal money or take advantage of his female players? Till now, Lee Bee Wah still has not quote an example to lend support to her words.
Liu Guodong has been sensible, graceful and magnanimous enough to be amenable to mediation by third parties while emphasizing that he does not want to destroy his relationship with STTA completely.
Had it been MM Lee, a lawyer’s letter will probably be sent to Lee Bee Wah by now and there will be no room for any mediation.
Can STTA please show some sincerity by taking back the words said by its President? Call a press conference and issue a public statement that “there is nothing wrong with Liu Guodong’s professionalism and integrity” and bring the saga to a fair and dignified ending.
It doesn’t even need to provide any explanation for not nominating Liu for the “Coach of the year award” or apologize on behalf of Lee Bee Wah. That’s all Liu had ever wanted - to clear his name.
I can draft the statement for STTA in less than one minute:
“The Singapore Table Tennis Association regrets the misunderstanding which had arisen from media reports about Coach Liu lacking “professionalism and integrity” as reasons for not nominating him for the “Coach of the year” award.
Coach Liu has been exemplary in both his character and professionalism during his stint with STTA. We thank him for his contributions and wish him all the best in his future endeavors.”
Come on, what’s so difficult about giving the man what he wants? That is the least he deserved from STTA after what had transpired. Why must this allow to drag on like an old broken tape recorder? Does STTA really want to wait for Liu’s return to Singapore to resolve the matter?
Just do it now and move on!
Addendum:
Regardless of the outcome, Lee Bee Wah has lost all moral authority to remain as President of STTA.
Please sign on the two online petitions if you haven’t done so:
1. Petition to DPM Teo Chee Hean to give special award to Liu Guodong
2. Petition to remove Lee Bee Wah as STTA President
Turn up at Hong Lim Park on 6 June 2009 between 5pm to 6.30pm to sign the petition calling for her removal as STTA President.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=28839.70
NHG's employee desperates to keep Lee Bee Wah issue alive
Lee Bee Wah to meet Liu Guodong; ex-President Yeo urged STTA to account to the public
According to reliable sources, Lee Bee Wah will be meeting Liu Guodong at a later date. Both parties are willing to resolve the matter amicably as soon as possible.
As Liu Guodong is very busy of late, it may need a bit more time to arrange for a suitable date to meet. Liu’s wife will be delivering on 29 June. He is likely to remain in Beijing.
In the meantime, ex-STTA President Yeo Guat Kwang expressed concerns that the Liu Guodong saga has dragged on for too long and urged STTA to settle the matter and give a proper account to the people as soon as possible.
Yeo said that STTA should handle the matter proactively as it arose out of its decision not to nominate Liu for the “Coach of the year” award.
He said that STTA had its own transparent system of settling disputes between the players and coaches and an independent committee can be appointed if necessary to bring the matter to a close.
“Though there is nothing wrong to remain silent at times, STTA should account to the public soon. This matter has dragged on for too long”, Yeo said.
Yeo praised Dr Vivian’s suggestion to seek a third party’s help in mediating to resolve the differences between them. He felt that since matters have come to such a stage, it is no longer a personal matter between the coach and STTA alone. It is time for STTA to come out and account itself to the public.
EDITORS’ NOTE:
We support Mr Yeo’s call for STTA to explain its recent actions to Singaporeans which appeared to lack “professionalism and integrity”.
STTA should call a press interview immediately to answer the following questions:
1. What are the criteria for a coach to qualified for nomination as “Coach of the year”?
2. What are the reasons behind STTA not nominating Liu Guodong for the award?
3. Is it an unanimous decision made by all members of STTA’s exco?
4. Does STTA support its President’s explanation that Liu was not nominated for the award because he lacked professionalism and integrity and if so, can it please substantiante its allegations?
5. Who ordered the two STTA officials to pass the English document to Liu Guodong to sign?
6. Who had been giving Shin Min Daily “insider information” to smear the character of Liu Guodong?
Regardless of the outcome, Lee Bee Wah has lost all moral authority to remain as President of STTA.
Please sign on the two online petitions if you haven’t done so:
1. Petition to DPM Teo Chee Hean to give special award to Liu Guodong
2. Petition to remove Lee Bee Wah as STTA President
Turn up at Hong Lim Park on 6 June 2009 between 5pm to 6.30pm to sign the petition calling for her removal as STTA President.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=28839.69
Saturday, May 30, 2009
China plans for the next big disaster
May 30, 2009
China plans for the next big disaster
By Peter J Brown
On the day before the first anniversary of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, China's Information Office of the State Council released a white paper entitled, "China's Actions for Disaster Prevention and Reduction". According to the white paper, frequent natural disasters in China and around the world have caused enormous losses of life and property.
"China is one of the countries in the world that suffers the most natural disasters," said the white paper. "Always placing people first, the Chinese government has all along put the security of people's lives and property on the top of its work, and has listed the disaster prevention and reduction in its economic and social development plan as an important guarantee of sustainable development."
In Section II of the white paper - "Strategic Goals and Tasks for Disaster Reduction" - the government clearly stated that one main objective is, "to strengthen the state capacity for emergency rescue and relief work. A coordinated and efficient disaster emergency management system will be built, characterized by unified command, sound coordination, clear division of work and level-by-level control with local authorities playing the main role. This will form, by and large, an emergency relief system covering all aspects."
A formal assessment of China's emergency response and recovery efforts following last year's earthquake was issued in December under the auspices of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with assistance from the Bangkok-based Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. The ADB report, "People's Republic of China: Providing Emergency Response to Sichuan Earthquake" is much longer - almost 200 pages - and, in many respects, more comprehensive and candid than the Chinese government's official white paper.
To get a complete picture, one must read both the white paper and the ADB report. When it comes to describing the current state of disaster response, mitigation and preparedness in China, the ADB report addresses real world concerns and looming gaps in China's approach to disaster response and emergency management from the national to the provincial, and on down to the grassroots level. Prepared for China's Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), it documents numerous deficiencies and organizational problems at all levels.
"There are few established comprehensive training strategies and programs, and coordinated multi-sectoral needs analyses, essential for the development of appropriate curricula and associated training materials, have not been undertaken. There is a lack of standards for disaster risk management training, and there is also no independent monitoring structure for the evaluation of disaster risk management training materials and activities," said the ADB report.
Contrast these observations with the following comments in the government's white paper.
"Classes on disaster emergency management for leading officials at the provincial level and classes on unexpected incidents emergency management for officials at the provincial and ministerial level have been held," said the white paper. "Since 2005, special training in disaster emergency management for civil servants has been actively carried out, which has effectively helped to improve the overall quality and ability of disaster emergency management personnel at various levels in preventing and dealing with natural disasters and other unexpected incidents."
One immediately detects a different tone in the ADB report, and a more direct message that cannot be ignored. The white paper paints a more optimistic picture, while the ADB report simply tries to be more realistic.
"It is vital that the plans are regularly improved and updated, and that drills are carried out to practice and test the plans. Moreover, a number of contingency plans are not practical enough, and there are too many conflicts between them, both vertically and horizontally," the ADB report stated.
According to the ADB report, the official death toll as a result of the Sichuan earthquake - the strongest earthquake in China in nearly 60 years - was 69,227 with 17,923 people missing, and 374,643 people injured. More than 46 million people were affected.
Sadly, lessons learned after the huge Tangshan earthquake of 1976 were never heeded, according to the ADB report.
"Most of the people did not know that an earthquake on this scale could occur in the area; and they did not have knowledge and measures which could be adopted to protect themselves and their families before and during the earthquake," stated the ADB report.
Besides the need for appropriate house and building design and construction practices - the terrible tragedy which cost thousands of young lives resulting from collapsed school buildings last year is a very sad and heated subject unto itself will not be discussed here - some of the other forgotten lessons from the 1976 earthquake which claimed approximately 240,000 lives included the fact that no suitably empowered disaster management agency was established in China, and there were so few properly trained and equipped rescue personnel despite "more than 100,000 troops [who] participated in rescue activities during the disaster".
China has changed a lot since then, however. Whereas China's borders were sealed before and after the Tangshan earthquake struck, in 2008 China was thankful for all the relief supplies that poured in from other countries along with trained rescue personnel and relief workers. China continues to express its gratitude for this aid.
Earth observation satellites operated by European, North American and other space agencies immediately started to gather and share satellite imagery of the impacted zone as part of a broad multinational space mobilization under the International Charter "Space and Major Disasters" which was activated by the National Disaster Reduction Center of China.
China has requested satellite flyovers on various occasions under the Charter since 2005, following massive floods in particular. A request for foreign satellites to survey Chinese territory under any circumstance would have been completely out of the question 32 years ago.
As part of a so-called system for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the Military Training and Arms Department of the General Staff Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) also announced in May the formation of five specialized PLA units which will be ready to respond to floods, earthquakes, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents, transportation sector-related disasters, and, international peacekeeping and disaster relief activities.
"In general, all of the Chinese armed forces, the PLA active and reserve forces, People's Armed Police Force, and militia, routinely take part in disaster relief operations in China. Disaster relief training has been incorporated in the PLAs official training program since 2002," said Dennis Blasko, author of The Chinese Army Today (Routledge, 2006), and a former US army attache in Beijing and Hong Kong during the 1990s. "The PLA's MOOTW system looks to me like the PLA is trying to codify lessons learned from all their recent experience and organize and train forces to be able to respond more rapidly and effectively in the future."
A total of 19 PLA engineering units have been assigned to flood response duties along all of China's major rivers since 1998, according to Blasko. During last year's relief efforts in Sichuan, active duty PLA forces from all services - army, navy, air force, and second artillery - and from all seven military regions were deployed in Sichuan and surrounding areas with many forces staying several months.
"This massive deployment revealed many shortcomings in the force which China has readily admitted to in the media even as the troops provided important support to the local government," said Blasko. "However, you would be wrong to assume that the PLA somehow dominates China's large-scale emergency management system. The PLA and other elements of the armed forces provide manpower and specialized assistance when requested. At all levels of government, military officials take part in the meetings on local and national security, but they are part of a large group of government and [Communist] Party officials that make these decisions."
China recognized that things had to be improved years ago. An article in the China Daily in January 2007, for example, described the forthcoming National Programs of Comprehensive Disaster Reduction, under the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10).
"Unlike the National Disaster Reduction Program of China (1998-2010), which emphasized principles, the new programs focus on information-sharing, coordinating ministry-level disaster prevention efforts, and increasing public awareness of how to respond to disasters." [1]
Still, at a meeting last September attended by the team preparing the ADB report and several representatives from various government agencies and others in Gansu province, local and provincial authorities along with ordinary citizens where everyone was encouraged to share their opinions, one sees that very little progress had been made.
Some attendees, "provided different opinions on the existing [governmental response], and recognized that [it] was not effective enough, particularly in the initial phase after the earthquake occurred. The group recognized that united leadership under the government was crucial, however, the Provincial Committee for Disaster Reduction was not able to fully exercise its important and key roles before, during and after the disaster, as its role is restricted to coordination and it does not have the power that it needs to undertake the broader role," the ADB report stated.
The attendees in Gansu then went on to describe "a series of problems on command, coordination and information dissemination during the disaster response and relief [efforts] ... There was no advanced equipment for disaster emergency response, such as satellite mobile phones, movable command vehicles and rescue tools. This affected relief activities significantly in the critical early stages of the disaster," the ADB report stated.
Another problem is that the individual offices responsible for disaster relief do not in and of themselves have the clout they need, nor are they set up to have it, according to Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at The Nixon Center in Washington, DC. Those offices play a coordinating function and are embedded within the MCA, which is supposed to provide the political clout.
"When a crisis occurs, there is a classification system that designates what level of political leader is in charge in the event of a disaster. That leader brings the clout and is expected to mobilize the different branches of the bureaucracy, which in normal times would exercise a certain degree of independence," said Thompson. "The relationship between the central government and the provinces is very different than the federal government and states [in the US]. In particular, Chinese provinces are, in financial terms, relatively less dependent on the central government compared to the US system. Certainly, central government funds flow to provinces and disaster areas in the event of a crisis, but those are ad hoc arrangements, rather than systematic, long-term budgetary relationships."
Here are just a few of the many recommendations (edited and abridged) that appear in the ADB report:
1. A National Disaster Management Authorized Agency (NDMAA) needs to be established with sufficient power at the national level, and similar emergency management agencies should be established at provincial and local levels. The NDMAA should adopt what is known as an "all hazards" approach under a steering committee composed of relevant ministers chaired by a top leader of the country.
2. Besides a National Disaster Management Operations Center under the NDMAA, a disaster management operations center should be established in each of six regions, along with a sophisticated and reliable network for activating and sustaining effective inter-provincial and intra-provincial command, control and coordination.
3. A comprehensive national law on disaster risk management must emerge which will also provide a legal basis for the establishment of the NDMAA, related committees and regional operation centers. Disaster risk management must rise to a higher level of priority, and, ongoing governmental and fiscal support for this and other related activities must be maintained in a stable, responsible and predictable manner over time.
4. An action plan for implementing the “National Plan for Comprehensive Disaster Reduction during the ‘Eleventh Five-Year Plan’ period of the People’s Republic of China" needs to be urgently developed, and disaster risk reduction needs to be mainstreamed into the development cycle at all levels.
5. A public-private partnership must emerge to collectively address the process of spreading disaster risk, and a flexible and responsive insurance compensation system should be established with the support and approval of the government, and the insurance sector.
"The Chinese government has made great efforts to reduce the risks and consequences of natural disasters. And yet, it is clearly aware that inadequacies exist that need to be addressed immediately," the white paper said.
Besides coordination and integration of relief efforts, laws and regulations concerning disaster reduction as well as related policies need to be improved. An effective disaster monitoring system is evolving, but it is not in place and operating in 2009. Support for the construction of disaster-resistant or reinforced infrastructure is lacking, and finally, public awareness needs to be enhanced, according to the white paper.
"As natural disasters pose a common challenge to mankind, disaster reduction is a global effort. China will continue to work unremittingly to reduce the risks and damage posed by natural disasters together with the rest of the world for the development and progress of human society," the white paper said.
Andrew Maskrey, the lead author of the new United Nations report -"Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction" - which was released in mid-May told the New York Times that China has not adequately addressed the surge in population in its coastal zone, and that China "has not yet developed the institutional mechanisms to reduce the risk that entails." [2]
China seems to take Maskrey's comments in stride and, for example, had already proceeded to highlight the uncertainty surrounding the seemingly unavoidable impact of climate change in its white paper.
"Now and for a fairly long time to come, the risks of extreme weather phenomena are increasing along with global climate changes. The probability of strong and extra-strong typhoons, tempests and other disasters is quite high," said the white paper.
Many of the goals and objectives that are spelled out in the white paper and ADB report will take at least two to three years to achieve, if not longer. Allocating sufficient funds, applying talented and well-managed human resources, and, maintaining a suitable momentum across multiple organizations, associations and communities will remain a huge challenge for China. Accomplishing this vital undertaking cannot be done simply by governmental decree alone.
Notes
1. 'Coordinate disaster response' China Daily.
2. Studies Tie Disaster Risk to Urban Growth The New York Times. May 16, 2009.
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA. His related commentaries primarily on emergency communications have appeared in the Washington Times, Journal of Emergency Management and Disaster Medicine & Public Health Preparedness, a journal of the American Medical Association. He is a contributor to Asia Times Online.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29994.1
China plans for the next big disaster
By Peter J Brown
On the day before the first anniversary of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, China's Information Office of the State Council released a white paper entitled, "China's Actions for Disaster Prevention and Reduction". According to the white paper, frequent natural disasters in China and around the world have caused enormous losses of life and property.
"China is one of the countries in the world that suffers the most natural disasters," said the white paper. "Always placing people first, the Chinese government has all along put the security of people's lives and property on the top of its work, and has listed the disaster prevention and reduction in its economic and social development plan as an important guarantee of sustainable development."
In Section II of the white paper - "Strategic Goals and Tasks for Disaster Reduction" - the government clearly stated that one main objective is, "to strengthen the state capacity for emergency rescue and relief work. A coordinated and efficient disaster emergency management system will be built, characterized by unified command, sound coordination, clear division of work and level-by-level control with local authorities playing the main role. This will form, by and large, an emergency relief system covering all aspects."
A formal assessment of China's emergency response and recovery efforts following last year's earthquake was issued in December under the auspices of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with assistance from the Bangkok-based Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. The ADB report, "People's Republic of China: Providing Emergency Response to Sichuan Earthquake" is much longer - almost 200 pages - and, in many respects, more comprehensive and candid than the Chinese government's official white paper.
To get a complete picture, one must read both the white paper and the ADB report. When it comes to describing the current state of disaster response, mitigation and preparedness in China, the ADB report addresses real world concerns and looming gaps in China's approach to disaster response and emergency management from the national to the provincial, and on down to the grassroots level. Prepared for China's Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), it documents numerous deficiencies and organizational problems at all levels.
"There are few established comprehensive training strategies and programs, and coordinated multi-sectoral needs analyses, essential for the development of appropriate curricula and associated training materials, have not been undertaken. There is a lack of standards for disaster risk management training, and there is also no independent monitoring structure for the evaluation of disaster risk management training materials and activities," said the ADB report.
Contrast these observations with the following comments in the government's white paper.
"Classes on disaster emergency management for leading officials at the provincial level and classes on unexpected incidents emergency management for officials at the provincial and ministerial level have been held," said the white paper. "Since 2005, special training in disaster emergency management for civil servants has been actively carried out, which has effectively helped to improve the overall quality and ability of disaster emergency management personnel at various levels in preventing and dealing with natural disasters and other unexpected incidents."
One immediately detects a different tone in the ADB report, and a more direct message that cannot be ignored. The white paper paints a more optimistic picture, while the ADB report simply tries to be more realistic.
"It is vital that the plans are regularly improved and updated, and that drills are carried out to practice and test the plans. Moreover, a number of contingency plans are not practical enough, and there are too many conflicts between them, both vertically and horizontally," the ADB report stated.
According to the ADB report, the official death toll as a result of the Sichuan earthquake - the strongest earthquake in China in nearly 60 years - was 69,227 with 17,923 people missing, and 374,643 people injured. More than 46 million people were affected.
Sadly, lessons learned after the huge Tangshan earthquake of 1976 were never heeded, according to the ADB report.
"Most of the people did not know that an earthquake on this scale could occur in the area; and they did not have knowledge and measures which could be adopted to protect themselves and their families before and during the earthquake," stated the ADB report.
Besides the need for appropriate house and building design and construction practices - the terrible tragedy which cost thousands of young lives resulting from collapsed school buildings last year is a very sad and heated subject unto itself will not be discussed here - some of the other forgotten lessons from the 1976 earthquake which claimed approximately 240,000 lives included the fact that no suitably empowered disaster management agency was established in China, and there were so few properly trained and equipped rescue personnel despite "more than 100,000 troops [who] participated in rescue activities during the disaster".
China has changed a lot since then, however. Whereas China's borders were sealed before and after the Tangshan earthquake struck, in 2008 China was thankful for all the relief supplies that poured in from other countries along with trained rescue personnel and relief workers. China continues to express its gratitude for this aid.
Earth observation satellites operated by European, North American and other space agencies immediately started to gather and share satellite imagery of the impacted zone as part of a broad multinational space mobilization under the International Charter "Space and Major Disasters" which was activated by the National Disaster Reduction Center of China.
China has requested satellite flyovers on various occasions under the Charter since 2005, following massive floods in particular. A request for foreign satellites to survey Chinese territory under any circumstance would have been completely out of the question 32 years ago.
As part of a so-called system for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the Military Training and Arms Department of the General Staff Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) also announced in May the formation of five specialized PLA units which will be ready to respond to floods, earthquakes, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents, transportation sector-related disasters, and, international peacekeeping and disaster relief activities.
"In general, all of the Chinese armed forces, the PLA active and reserve forces, People's Armed Police Force, and militia, routinely take part in disaster relief operations in China. Disaster relief training has been incorporated in the PLAs official training program since 2002," said Dennis Blasko, author of The Chinese Army Today (Routledge, 2006), and a former US army attache in Beijing and Hong Kong during the 1990s. "The PLA's MOOTW system looks to me like the PLA is trying to codify lessons learned from all their recent experience and organize and train forces to be able to respond more rapidly and effectively in the future."
A total of 19 PLA engineering units have been assigned to flood response duties along all of China's major rivers since 1998, according to Blasko. During last year's relief efforts in Sichuan, active duty PLA forces from all services - army, navy, air force, and second artillery - and from all seven military regions were deployed in Sichuan and surrounding areas with many forces staying several months.
"This massive deployment revealed many shortcomings in the force which China has readily admitted to in the media even as the troops provided important support to the local government," said Blasko. "However, you would be wrong to assume that the PLA somehow dominates China's large-scale emergency management system. The PLA and other elements of the armed forces provide manpower and specialized assistance when requested. At all levels of government, military officials take part in the meetings on local and national security, but they are part of a large group of government and [Communist] Party officials that make these decisions."
China recognized that things had to be improved years ago. An article in the China Daily in January 2007, for example, described the forthcoming National Programs of Comprehensive Disaster Reduction, under the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10).
"Unlike the National Disaster Reduction Program of China (1998-2010), which emphasized principles, the new programs focus on information-sharing, coordinating ministry-level disaster prevention efforts, and increasing public awareness of how to respond to disasters." [1]
Still, at a meeting last September attended by the team preparing the ADB report and several representatives from various government agencies and others in Gansu province, local and provincial authorities along with ordinary citizens where everyone was encouraged to share their opinions, one sees that very little progress had been made.
Some attendees, "provided different opinions on the existing [governmental response], and recognized that [it] was not effective enough, particularly in the initial phase after the earthquake occurred. The group recognized that united leadership under the government was crucial, however, the Provincial Committee for Disaster Reduction was not able to fully exercise its important and key roles before, during and after the disaster, as its role is restricted to coordination and it does not have the power that it needs to undertake the broader role," the ADB report stated.
The attendees in Gansu then went on to describe "a series of problems on command, coordination and information dissemination during the disaster response and relief [efforts] ... There was no advanced equipment for disaster emergency response, such as satellite mobile phones, movable command vehicles and rescue tools. This affected relief activities significantly in the critical early stages of the disaster," the ADB report stated.
Another problem is that the individual offices responsible for disaster relief do not in and of themselves have the clout they need, nor are they set up to have it, according to Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at The Nixon Center in Washington, DC. Those offices play a coordinating function and are embedded within the MCA, which is supposed to provide the political clout.
"When a crisis occurs, there is a classification system that designates what level of political leader is in charge in the event of a disaster. That leader brings the clout and is expected to mobilize the different branches of the bureaucracy, which in normal times would exercise a certain degree of independence," said Thompson. "The relationship between the central government and the provinces is very different than the federal government and states [in the US]. In particular, Chinese provinces are, in financial terms, relatively less dependent on the central government compared to the US system. Certainly, central government funds flow to provinces and disaster areas in the event of a crisis, but those are ad hoc arrangements, rather than systematic, long-term budgetary relationships."
Here are just a few of the many recommendations (edited and abridged) that appear in the ADB report:
1. A National Disaster Management Authorized Agency (NDMAA) needs to be established with sufficient power at the national level, and similar emergency management agencies should be established at provincial and local levels. The NDMAA should adopt what is known as an "all hazards" approach under a steering committee composed of relevant ministers chaired by a top leader of the country.
2. Besides a National Disaster Management Operations Center under the NDMAA, a disaster management operations center should be established in each of six regions, along with a sophisticated and reliable network for activating and sustaining effective inter-provincial and intra-provincial command, control and coordination.
3. A comprehensive national law on disaster risk management must emerge which will also provide a legal basis for the establishment of the NDMAA, related committees and regional operation centers. Disaster risk management must rise to a higher level of priority, and, ongoing governmental and fiscal support for this and other related activities must be maintained in a stable, responsible and predictable manner over time.
4. An action plan for implementing the “National Plan for Comprehensive Disaster Reduction during the ‘Eleventh Five-Year Plan’ period of the People’s Republic of China" needs to be urgently developed, and disaster risk reduction needs to be mainstreamed into the development cycle at all levels.
5. A public-private partnership must emerge to collectively address the process of spreading disaster risk, and a flexible and responsive insurance compensation system should be established with the support and approval of the government, and the insurance sector.
"The Chinese government has made great efforts to reduce the risks and consequences of natural disasters. And yet, it is clearly aware that inadequacies exist that need to be addressed immediately," the white paper said.
Besides coordination and integration of relief efforts, laws and regulations concerning disaster reduction as well as related policies need to be improved. An effective disaster monitoring system is evolving, but it is not in place and operating in 2009. Support for the construction of disaster-resistant or reinforced infrastructure is lacking, and finally, public awareness needs to be enhanced, according to the white paper.
"As natural disasters pose a common challenge to mankind, disaster reduction is a global effort. China will continue to work unremittingly to reduce the risks and damage posed by natural disasters together with the rest of the world for the development and progress of human society," the white paper said.
Andrew Maskrey, the lead author of the new United Nations report -"Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction" - which was released in mid-May told the New York Times that China has not adequately addressed the surge in population in its coastal zone, and that China "has not yet developed the institutional mechanisms to reduce the risk that entails." [2]
China seems to take Maskrey's comments in stride and, for example, had already proceeded to highlight the uncertainty surrounding the seemingly unavoidable impact of climate change in its white paper.
"Now and for a fairly long time to come, the risks of extreme weather phenomena are increasing along with global climate changes. The probability of strong and extra-strong typhoons, tempests and other disasters is quite high," said the white paper.
Many of the goals and objectives that are spelled out in the white paper and ADB report will take at least two to three years to achieve, if not longer. Allocating sufficient funds, applying talented and well-managed human resources, and, maintaining a suitable momentum across multiple organizations, associations and communities will remain a huge challenge for China. Accomplishing this vital undertaking cannot be done simply by governmental decree alone.
Notes
1. 'Coordinate disaster response' China Daily.
2. Studies Tie Disaster Risk to Urban Growth The New York Times. May 16, 2009.
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA. His related commentaries primarily on emergency communications have appeared in the Washington Times, Journal of Emergency Management and Disaster Medicine & Public Health Preparedness, a journal of the American Medical Association. He is a contributor to Asia Times Online.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29994.1
Johan Skarendal: I'm here to observe, not intervene
Internet forums abuzz with Swedish activist's meeting with local human rights group. He says:
I'm here to observe, not intervene
WHY was he in Singapore?
By Liew Hanqing
30 May 2009
WHY was he in Singapore?
What was the rationale for his meeting with a local human rights organisation here? Is his organisation funding this, or any other, group here?
These questions are just some that have been bandied about since Mr Johan Skarendal, 29, visited Singapore last month.
Mr Skarendal is a member of the Swedish International Liberal Centre (SILC), a foundation which claims to assist democracy development.
Some Singaporeans he met with during his recent visit are members of a local human rights organisation called Maruah (Malay for dignity).
Maruah's members include former Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) Braema Mathi, NMP Siew Kum Hong, lawyer Peter Low, academic Cherian George, Dr Stuart Koe, founder of gay media company Fridae, and Mr Leong Sze Hian, president of the Society of Financial Service Professionals.
Online speculation on the meeting's agenda has been rife, with netizens questioning whether the foundation has been funding Maruah's activities.
Mr Skarendal did not answer The New Paper's questions on whether SILC is currently funding the work of any Singaporean individuals or organisations, but stressed that the topic of funding was not broached during the recent meeting.
Ms Mathi, Maruah's chairman, added that it is common for human rights advocates to meet with 'like-minded' people from other countries, whether in Singapore or overseas.
She clarified that Maruah does not currently receive any external funding.
'We are paying for everything out of our own pockets,' she said.
Mr Skarendal described his latest visit as a 'fact-finding' visit.
'I was mostly interested in the work and backgrounds of the people involved - I wanted to learn about how prominent Singaporeans involved in civil society viewed the human rights issues in Singapore,' he said.
'Funding not discussed'
None of the Maruah members present at the meeting raised the subject of funding, Mr Skarendal said.
He said: 'I went to Singapore on behalf of SILC to learn from and observe Singaporean civil society, not to intervene.'
Confirming he met with Mr Skarendal last month, Mr Leong Sze Hian, who attended as a representative of Maruah, said Mr Skarendal asked questions pertaining to Maruah's work here.
Said Mr Leong: 'He asked about the work that Maruah does - what activities are being planned, and so on.'
One of the upcoming events Maruah has planned is a peace vigil for the freedom of Aung San Suu Kyi on 31 May at Hong Lim Park.
Ms Mathi said such events are completely paid for by Maruah members.
The group does not incur any day-to-day operating costs.
She said: 'When we started Maruah, we set ourselves some ground rules - to be as transparent as possible, to post our accounts - if any - online, not to break any Singapore law, and not to have any members with political party affiliations.'
The group is currently funded solely by its members.
Ms Mathi said, however, that the group would eventually have to seek funding from external sources as it grows, and that Maruah would likely first seek local sources of funding.
She added that she is disappointed with the recent spate of online allegations against the group's members.
She said: 'The allegations are misleading and mischief-laden, and belittle the hard work of civil society.'
The recent visit was not Mr Skarendal's first time to Singapore.
In 2003, Swedish foundations, comprising SILC, the Olof Palme Centre, and the Jarl Hjarlmarson Foundation co-sponsored an international youth conference in Singapore where young Swedish parliamentarians and youth leaders met with young Singaporeans to discuss democracy.
The same year, Mr Skarendal met with Singapore Democratic Party secretary-general Chee Soon Juan for the first time when DrChee visited Sweden.
Said Mr Skarendal: 'We have become good friends ever since. In fact, he had written my testimonial when I had applied to do my Masters degree at the Taiwanese National Chengchi University in 2006.'
What's Maruah
MARUAH, the Singapore Working Committee for an Asean Human Rights Mechanism, was formed in September 2007.
The group, which aims to raise awareness of human rights, was formed after Asean leaders decided in July 2007 to include a provision for a human rights body in the Asean Charter.
Maruah's members include students, academics, activists, lawyers, doctors and writers.
The group has organised various events for several causes, including a gathering appealing for fair working conditions for workers, a public lecture on human rights in Asean, and an upcoming peace vigil for Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom.
The group's immediate task is to transition from being an interim committee to a full-fledged national working group, and to eventually establish a Singapore presence at regional discussions.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=28866.79
I'm here to observe, not intervene
WHY was he in Singapore?
By Liew Hanqing
30 May 2009
WHY was he in Singapore?
What was the rationale for his meeting with a local human rights organisation here? Is his organisation funding this, or any other, group here?
These questions are just some that have been bandied about since Mr Johan Skarendal, 29, visited Singapore last month.
Mr Skarendal is a member of the Swedish International Liberal Centre (SILC), a foundation which claims to assist democracy development.
Some Singaporeans he met with during his recent visit are members of a local human rights organisation called Maruah (Malay for dignity).
Maruah's members include former Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) Braema Mathi, NMP Siew Kum Hong, lawyer Peter Low, academic Cherian George, Dr Stuart Koe, founder of gay media company Fridae, and Mr Leong Sze Hian, president of the Society of Financial Service Professionals.
Online speculation on the meeting's agenda has been rife, with netizens questioning whether the foundation has been funding Maruah's activities.
Mr Skarendal did not answer The New Paper's questions on whether SILC is currently funding the work of any Singaporean individuals or organisations, but stressed that the topic of funding was not broached during the recent meeting.
Ms Mathi, Maruah's chairman, added that it is common for human rights advocates to meet with 'like-minded' people from other countries, whether in Singapore or overseas.
She clarified that Maruah does not currently receive any external funding.
'We are paying for everything out of our own pockets,' she said.
Mr Skarendal described his latest visit as a 'fact-finding' visit.
'I was mostly interested in the work and backgrounds of the people involved - I wanted to learn about how prominent Singaporeans involved in civil society viewed the human rights issues in Singapore,' he said.
'Funding not discussed'
None of the Maruah members present at the meeting raised the subject of funding, Mr Skarendal said.
He said: 'I went to Singapore on behalf of SILC to learn from and observe Singaporean civil society, not to intervene.'
Confirming he met with Mr Skarendal last month, Mr Leong Sze Hian, who attended as a representative of Maruah, said Mr Skarendal asked questions pertaining to Maruah's work here.
Said Mr Leong: 'He asked about the work that Maruah does - what activities are being planned, and so on.'
One of the upcoming events Maruah has planned is a peace vigil for the freedom of Aung San Suu Kyi on 31 May at Hong Lim Park.
Ms Mathi said such events are completely paid for by Maruah members.
The group does not incur any day-to-day operating costs.
She said: 'When we started Maruah, we set ourselves some ground rules - to be as transparent as possible, to post our accounts - if any - online, not to break any Singapore law, and not to have any members with political party affiliations.'
The group is currently funded solely by its members.
Ms Mathi said, however, that the group would eventually have to seek funding from external sources as it grows, and that Maruah would likely first seek local sources of funding.
She added that she is disappointed with the recent spate of online allegations against the group's members.
She said: 'The allegations are misleading and mischief-laden, and belittle the hard work of civil society.'
The recent visit was not Mr Skarendal's first time to Singapore.
In 2003, Swedish foundations, comprising SILC, the Olof Palme Centre, and the Jarl Hjarlmarson Foundation co-sponsored an international youth conference in Singapore where young Swedish parliamentarians and youth leaders met with young Singaporeans to discuss democracy.
The same year, Mr Skarendal met with Singapore Democratic Party secretary-general Chee Soon Juan for the first time when DrChee visited Sweden.
Said Mr Skarendal: 'We have become good friends ever since. In fact, he had written my testimonial when I had applied to do my Masters degree at the Taiwanese National Chengchi University in 2006.'
What's Maruah
MARUAH, the Singapore Working Committee for an Asean Human Rights Mechanism, was formed in September 2007.
The group, which aims to raise awareness of human rights, was formed after Asean leaders decided in July 2007 to include a provision for a human rights body in the Asean Charter.
Maruah's members include students, academics, activists, lawyers, doctors and writers.
The group has organised various events for several causes, including a gathering appealing for fair working conditions for workers, a public lecture on human rights in Asean, and an upcoming peace vigil for Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom.
The group's immediate task is to transition from being an interim committee to a full-fledged national working group, and to eventually establish a Singapore presence at regional discussions.
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