May 28, 2009
Beijing weighs its options
By Jing-dong Yuan
MONTEREY, California - Beijing responded to North Korea's latest nuclear test on Monday with a strong statement decrying Pyongyang's disregard for the common goals of the international community and making clear the Chinese government's "resolute opposition" to the test.
"China strongly demands that North Korea keep its promise of denuclearization and cease all actions that could further worsen the situation," the Foreign Ministry statement said.
North Korea's nuclear test followed last month's launch of a long-range missile and a steady escalation of tensions on the peninsular. After the launch and subsequent international criticism, North Korea announced it was expelling nuclear inspectors, scrapping inter-Korean agreements and would "never" return to the six-party talks. The talks involve China, the United States, South Korean, Russia and Japan, and are aimed at dismantling the North's nuclear weapons program.
Pyongyang's defiant nuclear test has drawn further international condemnation. The United Nations Security Council moved quickly to call an emergency meeting which described the test as a clear violation of UN Resolution 1718, which prohibits the reclusive communist state from exploding a nuclear weapon. It is expected that the council will decide on further action in the coming days.
The nuclear test is another major setback for the international community, and in particular the six-party talks, which began in August 2003. As the host of this multilateral negotiation process, and a country with important stakes in the stability of the region, China now faces major challenges. How to balance its response to the test, while keeping in mind its longer-term security interests, will be an important test of Beijing's diplomatic skills.
China's involvement in efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear issue coincided with three phases of events. The first phase, between North Korea's first announcement of nuclear plans in October 2002 and Beijing's hosting of the first trilateral meeting between China, North Korea and the United States in April 2003, saw a China reluctant to take up any active role in defusing the crisis. Beijing argued that Pyongyang and Washington should find ways to resolve their disputes and to return to the agreed framework.
However, the George W Bush administration's refusal to engage in direct bilateral dialogue with North Korea, Pyongyang's withdrawal from the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and its reactivation of the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, raised the stakes and convinced China that it had to step in and defuse the situation.
The second phase began with the initiation of the six-party talks in August 2003 and ran through October 2007 when the six parties - the two Koreas, the US, Japan, China and Russia - agreed on a nuclear disablement plan. China played an active role not only as an impartial host but also an engaged and skillful negotiator at each critical juncture of the bumpy negotiation process. A joint statement made on September 19, 2005, and the action plan of February 13, 2007 laid out a road map for the eventual nuclear disarmament on the peninsular, and Beijing's tireless efforts received well-deserved respect.
The change of government in South Korea in early 2008 ushered in the third phase. The new Lee Myung-bak administration abandoned the reconciliatory Sunshine policy of its predecessor and demanded reciprocity in inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang reacted strongly to what it saw as a hostile policy from the South. Major disputes also emerged between Pyongyang and Washington over nuclear disablement and verification issues, and North Korea began in late 2008 to significantly slow the de-nuclearization process.
North Korea's latest nuclear test has now again put China on the spot. As the UN Security Council deliberates its response and action in the coming weeks, whether Beijing would agree to new and tougher sanctions has already become a question of intense debate and speculation. There is also renewed focus on if and how China can use its leverage to exert pressure on Pyongyang.
These are understandable - albeit for some unrealistic and even unreasonable - expectations. Indeed, China has become North Korea's largest partner in trade and investment, averaging US$2 billion annually in recent years and China provides the North with significant energy and food supplies. Given that China supports a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, there is ample reason to believe that Beijing expects Pyongyang to respect that position. But so far events have proven otherwise. Where is Beijing's leverage and why is it not willing to use it?
Looking at China's positions on the North Korean nuclear issue over the years, one can summarize that they consistently emphasize three core elements: denuclearization, peninsular peace and stability, and resolution through diplomacy and dialogue. Beijing views North Korea's nuclear program as a symptom, not a cause, of insecurity and instability in the region. Any action that further aggravates the situation will not help solve but can only escalate nuclear tension. This is why the Chinese government has called on all parties involved to "respond in a calm and appropriate manner and persist in solving the problems through consultations and dialogue".
Clearly, the issue is not whether China has the leverage and the willingness to use it against North Korea; it is the calculation of what impacts on what specific goals such pressure would generate. China has over the past six years selectively used such pressure to good effect without completely losing influence, however limited it may be. Beijing has already concluded, as have many others, that the key to solving this problem remains direct dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington.
China views stability on the Korean Peninsula as essential for its near to mid-term strategic objectives, continued economic development, domestic stability and international standing, as each requires a peaceful regional security environment. For this reason alone, it can be expected that Beijing will endorse condemnation of North Korea's behavior and limited but not severe sanctions that could seriously undermine its interests. But getting to that point depends on how skillful the Chinese diplomacy is in the corridors of the United Nations Security Council.
Dr Jing-dong Yuan is director of East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, and an associate professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
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Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Sunday, May 31, 2009
China says 'no thanks' to G-2
May 29, 2009
China says 'no thanks' to G-2
By Jian Junbo
SHANGHAI - At the Sino-European Union (EU) summit in Prague last week, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao rejected the concept of a Group of Two (G-2) comprising China and the United States, saying "it is totally ungrounded and wrong to talk about the dominance of two countries in international affairs".
It was the first time a Chinese leader has publicly commented on the notion of a G-2, though Wen and a number of Chinese officials and think-tanks had cast doubt on the practicability of past notions of a "Chimerica".
The idea of a G-2 was first forwarded by US academic circles in 2006, but it was raised again by Zbigniew Brzezinski, an influential specialist in international relations and national security advisor to former US president Jimmy Carter, in Beijing in January as the two countries celebrated the 30th anniversary of establishing formal diplomatic ties.
Similar to "Chimerica", which would put the US and China at the forefront of international affairs, the idea of a G-2 grouping has attracted wide attention, especially as Brzezinski was an advisor to President Barack Obama during the presidential elections.
In the Group of 20 (G-20) summit in London last month, the G-2 was floated again in the Western media and academic circles. Then after several weeks, on the eve of this month's just-concluded 11th Sino-EU summit, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband predicted that over the next few decades, China would become one of the two "powers that count".
He said, "China was becoming an indispensable power in the 21st century in the way [former US secretary of state] Madeleine Albright said the US was an indispensable power at the end of the last century". He also argued it would be up to Europe if it wanted to change the G-2 into a G-3.
While widely discussed, the concept of a G-2 has not been clearly defined. According to Brzezinski, G-2 described the current reality, yet for Miliband, G-2 was a possibility in the foreseeable future.
The exact structure of the proposed G-2 is also unclear. A G-2 would seem to imply that the group would have the strength, capability and will to set the agenda for international affairs. It could be argued, as only two countries are involved, that this would resemble world hegemony.
China has neither the capacity nor the desire to become a member of a G-2. It is true that China has the world's third-largest economy, is the biggest creditor to the world's sole superpower - the United States, and is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security council, and China indeed seems a big power.
However, with its huge population and wealth and development gaps, China can also be seen as a poor, underdeveloped country - its per capita GDP was ranked 104th globally last year by the World Bank. China is still a developing country, and by comparison the US is far more advanced in almost all economic sectors and in soft power and military strength. At this stage and in the foreseeable future, there is no match between China and the US in terms of overall strength.
The responsibility of a G-2 member to jointly shape the world's economy and international affairs is too far beyond China's ability and ambitions. It is unwise for a country, like a person, to commit itself to something beyond its ability. That is why when Western commentators discuss the G-2, China is inevitably suspicious of their intentions. Many Chinese scholars fear that under a G-2, China could be enmeshed into a structure built by the US, and required to make more contributions to world economic and social development than it can afford.
A G-2 would also imply a need for China to overhaul domestic governance. As a member of G-2, China would need to be a leader in both foreign and internal affairs, and this has raised fears of Western intervention in China's domestic affairs.
The grouping also goes against core principles of China's foreign policy such as multilateralism and the desire for a multipolar world order. For example, Wen stressed on at the Prague Sino-EU summit the importance of China's relations with the EU.
Another major reason for China to reject a G-2 is that it is would not be legitimate international structure. If G-2 was built with the help of the US, then the question is who can empower or authorize the US to do that? We can imagine the G-2 would be refused by most countries if taken to a global referendum. No other country, except for US, wants to see the emergence of "pax-Chimericana". The rejection of a G-2 does not mean China will shirk its global responsibilities. China has welcomed the increased role it and other big developing countries enjoy through the G-20 framework.
Even if a G-2 became a reality, it could never replace the power, function and authority of the UN as the sole international organization recognized by the majority of states in the world. Although there are many problems that the UN faces in regard to its effectiveness and accountability, it is still the best platform for the international community to peacefully deal with issues of common interest.
As the US became the target of anti-Americanism in the world after former president George W Bush started the Iraq war in 2003, G-2 one day could also be the target of anti-hegemony or anti-imperialist movements, affecting China's global image.
Another reason is related to the rise of civil society as an increasingly important factor in international governance, especially since the end of the Cold War. Without the participation of transnational non-government organizations (NGOs), many international issues can not be resolved successfully. Yet if G-2 was accountable for international governance it could be a threat to global civil society because as a hegemonic structure it could limit the function and ability of other actors including other countries, the UN and lots of NGOs.
It is self evident that a G-2 would not be good for other countries and powers, especially rising industrial stars like India, Russia and Brazil. All of these nations have the ambition to compete for influence and power with both US and China in the international arena. The idea of a G-2 is based neither upon the realities of international politics nor on the willingness of China and the rest of the world.
Dr Jian Junbo is assistant professor of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, China.
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China says 'no thanks' to G-2
By Jian Junbo
SHANGHAI - At the Sino-European Union (EU) summit in Prague last week, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao rejected the concept of a Group of Two (G-2) comprising China and the United States, saying "it is totally ungrounded and wrong to talk about the dominance of two countries in international affairs".
It was the first time a Chinese leader has publicly commented on the notion of a G-2, though Wen and a number of Chinese officials and think-tanks had cast doubt on the practicability of past notions of a "Chimerica".
The idea of a G-2 was first forwarded by US academic circles in 2006, but it was raised again by Zbigniew Brzezinski, an influential specialist in international relations and national security advisor to former US president Jimmy Carter, in Beijing in January as the two countries celebrated the 30th anniversary of establishing formal diplomatic ties.
Similar to "Chimerica", which would put the US and China at the forefront of international affairs, the idea of a G-2 grouping has attracted wide attention, especially as Brzezinski was an advisor to President Barack Obama during the presidential elections.
In the Group of 20 (G-20) summit in London last month, the G-2 was floated again in the Western media and academic circles. Then after several weeks, on the eve of this month's just-concluded 11th Sino-EU summit, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband predicted that over the next few decades, China would become one of the two "powers that count".
He said, "China was becoming an indispensable power in the 21st century in the way [former US secretary of state] Madeleine Albright said the US was an indispensable power at the end of the last century". He also argued it would be up to Europe if it wanted to change the G-2 into a G-3.
While widely discussed, the concept of a G-2 has not been clearly defined. According to Brzezinski, G-2 described the current reality, yet for Miliband, G-2 was a possibility in the foreseeable future.
The exact structure of the proposed G-2 is also unclear. A G-2 would seem to imply that the group would have the strength, capability and will to set the agenda for international affairs. It could be argued, as only two countries are involved, that this would resemble world hegemony.
China has neither the capacity nor the desire to become a member of a G-2. It is true that China has the world's third-largest economy, is the biggest creditor to the world's sole superpower - the United States, and is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security council, and China indeed seems a big power.
However, with its huge population and wealth and development gaps, China can also be seen as a poor, underdeveloped country - its per capita GDP was ranked 104th globally last year by the World Bank. China is still a developing country, and by comparison the US is far more advanced in almost all economic sectors and in soft power and military strength. At this stage and in the foreseeable future, there is no match between China and the US in terms of overall strength.
The responsibility of a G-2 member to jointly shape the world's economy and international affairs is too far beyond China's ability and ambitions. It is unwise for a country, like a person, to commit itself to something beyond its ability. That is why when Western commentators discuss the G-2, China is inevitably suspicious of their intentions. Many Chinese scholars fear that under a G-2, China could be enmeshed into a structure built by the US, and required to make more contributions to world economic and social development than it can afford.
A G-2 would also imply a need for China to overhaul domestic governance. As a member of G-2, China would need to be a leader in both foreign and internal affairs, and this has raised fears of Western intervention in China's domestic affairs.
The grouping also goes against core principles of China's foreign policy such as multilateralism and the desire for a multipolar world order. For example, Wen stressed on at the Prague Sino-EU summit the importance of China's relations with the EU.
Another major reason for China to reject a G-2 is that it is would not be legitimate international structure. If G-2 was built with the help of the US, then the question is who can empower or authorize the US to do that? We can imagine the G-2 would be refused by most countries if taken to a global referendum. No other country, except for US, wants to see the emergence of "pax-Chimericana". The rejection of a G-2 does not mean China will shirk its global responsibilities. China has welcomed the increased role it and other big developing countries enjoy through the G-20 framework.
Even if a G-2 became a reality, it could never replace the power, function and authority of the UN as the sole international organization recognized by the majority of states in the world. Although there are many problems that the UN faces in regard to its effectiveness and accountability, it is still the best platform for the international community to peacefully deal with issues of common interest.
As the US became the target of anti-Americanism in the world after former president George W Bush started the Iraq war in 2003, G-2 one day could also be the target of anti-hegemony or anti-imperialist movements, affecting China's global image.
Another reason is related to the rise of civil society as an increasingly important factor in international governance, especially since the end of the Cold War. Without the participation of transnational non-government organizations (NGOs), many international issues can not be resolved successfully. Yet if G-2 was accountable for international governance it could be a threat to global civil society because as a hegemonic structure it could limit the function and ability of other actors including other countries, the UN and lots of NGOs.
It is self evident that a G-2 would not be good for other countries and powers, especially rising industrial stars like India, Russia and Brazil. All of these nations have the ambition to compete for influence and power with both US and China in the international arena. The idea of a G-2 is based neither upon the realities of international politics nor on the willingness of China and the rest of the world.
Dr Jian Junbo is assistant professor of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, China.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29991.1
Saturday, May 30, 2009
China plans for the next big disaster
May 30, 2009
China plans for the next big disaster
By Peter J Brown
On the day before the first anniversary of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, China's Information Office of the State Council released a white paper entitled, "China's Actions for Disaster Prevention and Reduction". According to the white paper, frequent natural disasters in China and around the world have caused enormous losses of life and property.
"China is one of the countries in the world that suffers the most natural disasters," said the white paper. "Always placing people first, the Chinese government has all along put the security of people's lives and property on the top of its work, and has listed the disaster prevention and reduction in its economic and social development plan as an important guarantee of sustainable development."
In Section II of the white paper - "Strategic Goals and Tasks for Disaster Reduction" - the government clearly stated that one main objective is, "to strengthen the state capacity for emergency rescue and relief work. A coordinated and efficient disaster emergency management system will be built, characterized by unified command, sound coordination, clear division of work and level-by-level control with local authorities playing the main role. This will form, by and large, an emergency relief system covering all aspects."
A formal assessment of China's emergency response and recovery efforts following last year's earthquake was issued in December under the auspices of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with assistance from the Bangkok-based Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. The ADB report, "People's Republic of China: Providing Emergency Response to Sichuan Earthquake" is much longer - almost 200 pages - and, in many respects, more comprehensive and candid than the Chinese government's official white paper.
To get a complete picture, one must read both the white paper and the ADB report. When it comes to describing the current state of disaster response, mitigation and preparedness in China, the ADB report addresses real world concerns and looming gaps in China's approach to disaster response and emergency management from the national to the provincial, and on down to the grassroots level. Prepared for China's Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), it documents numerous deficiencies and organizational problems at all levels.
"There are few established comprehensive training strategies and programs, and coordinated multi-sectoral needs analyses, essential for the development of appropriate curricula and associated training materials, have not been undertaken. There is a lack of standards for disaster risk management training, and there is also no independent monitoring structure for the evaluation of disaster risk management training materials and activities," said the ADB report.
Contrast these observations with the following comments in the government's white paper.
"Classes on disaster emergency management for leading officials at the provincial level and classes on unexpected incidents emergency management for officials at the provincial and ministerial level have been held," said the white paper. "Since 2005, special training in disaster emergency management for civil servants has been actively carried out, which has effectively helped to improve the overall quality and ability of disaster emergency management personnel at various levels in preventing and dealing with natural disasters and other unexpected incidents."
One immediately detects a different tone in the ADB report, and a more direct message that cannot be ignored. The white paper paints a more optimistic picture, while the ADB report simply tries to be more realistic.
"It is vital that the plans are regularly improved and updated, and that drills are carried out to practice and test the plans. Moreover, a number of contingency plans are not practical enough, and there are too many conflicts between them, both vertically and horizontally," the ADB report stated.
According to the ADB report, the official death toll as a result of the Sichuan earthquake - the strongest earthquake in China in nearly 60 years - was 69,227 with 17,923 people missing, and 374,643 people injured. More than 46 million people were affected.
Sadly, lessons learned after the huge Tangshan earthquake of 1976 were never heeded, according to the ADB report.
"Most of the people did not know that an earthquake on this scale could occur in the area; and they did not have knowledge and measures which could be adopted to protect themselves and their families before and during the earthquake," stated the ADB report.
Besides the need for appropriate house and building design and construction practices - the terrible tragedy which cost thousands of young lives resulting from collapsed school buildings last year is a very sad and heated subject unto itself will not be discussed here - some of the other forgotten lessons from the 1976 earthquake which claimed approximately 240,000 lives included the fact that no suitably empowered disaster management agency was established in China, and there were so few properly trained and equipped rescue personnel despite "more than 100,000 troops [who] participated in rescue activities during the disaster".
China has changed a lot since then, however. Whereas China's borders were sealed before and after the Tangshan earthquake struck, in 2008 China was thankful for all the relief supplies that poured in from other countries along with trained rescue personnel and relief workers. China continues to express its gratitude for this aid.
Earth observation satellites operated by European, North American and other space agencies immediately started to gather and share satellite imagery of the impacted zone as part of a broad multinational space mobilization under the International Charter "Space and Major Disasters" which was activated by the National Disaster Reduction Center of China.
China has requested satellite flyovers on various occasions under the Charter since 2005, following massive floods in particular. A request for foreign satellites to survey Chinese territory under any circumstance would have been completely out of the question 32 years ago.
As part of a so-called system for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the Military Training and Arms Department of the General Staff Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) also announced in May the formation of five specialized PLA units which will be ready to respond to floods, earthquakes, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents, transportation sector-related disasters, and, international peacekeeping and disaster relief activities.
"In general, all of the Chinese armed forces, the PLA active and reserve forces, People's Armed Police Force, and militia, routinely take part in disaster relief operations in China. Disaster relief training has been incorporated in the PLAs official training program since 2002," said Dennis Blasko, author of The Chinese Army Today (Routledge, 2006), and a former US army attache in Beijing and Hong Kong during the 1990s. "The PLA's MOOTW system looks to me like the PLA is trying to codify lessons learned from all their recent experience and organize and train forces to be able to respond more rapidly and effectively in the future."
A total of 19 PLA engineering units have been assigned to flood response duties along all of China's major rivers since 1998, according to Blasko. During last year's relief efforts in Sichuan, active duty PLA forces from all services - army, navy, air force, and second artillery - and from all seven military regions were deployed in Sichuan and surrounding areas with many forces staying several months.
"This massive deployment revealed many shortcomings in the force which China has readily admitted to in the media even as the troops provided important support to the local government," said Blasko. "However, you would be wrong to assume that the PLA somehow dominates China's large-scale emergency management system. The PLA and other elements of the armed forces provide manpower and specialized assistance when requested. At all levels of government, military officials take part in the meetings on local and national security, but they are part of a large group of government and [Communist] Party officials that make these decisions."
China recognized that things had to be improved years ago. An article in the China Daily in January 2007, for example, described the forthcoming National Programs of Comprehensive Disaster Reduction, under the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10).
"Unlike the National Disaster Reduction Program of China (1998-2010), which emphasized principles, the new programs focus on information-sharing, coordinating ministry-level disaster prevention efforts, and increasing public awareness of how to respond to disasters." [1]
Still, at a meeting last September attended by the team preparing the ADB report and several representatives from various government agencies and others in Gansu province, local and provincial authorities along with ordinary citizens where everyone was encouraged to share their opinions, one sees that very little progress had been made.
Some attendees, "provided different opinions on the existing [governmental response], and recognized that [it] was not effective enough, particularly in the initial phase after the earthquake occurred. The group recognized that united leadership under the government was crucial, however, the Provincial Committee for Disaster Reduction was not able to fully exercise its important and key roles before, during and after the disaster, as its role is restricted to coordination and it does not have the power that it needs to undertake the broader role," the ADB report stated.
The attendees in Gansu then went on to describe "a series of problems on command, coordination and information dissemination during the disaster response and relief [efforts] ... There was no advanced equipment for disaster emergency response, such as satellite mobile phones, movable command vehicles and rescue tools. This affected relief activities significantly in the critical early stages of the disaster," the ADB report stated.
Another problem is that the individual offices responsible for disaster relief do not in and of themselves have the clout they need, nor are they set up to have it, according to Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at The Nixon Center in Washington, DC. Those offices play a coordinating function and are embedded within the MCA, which is supposed to provide the political clout.
"When a crisis occurs, there is a classification system that designates what level of political leader is in charge in the event of a disaster. That leader brings the clout and is expected to mobilize the different branches of the bureaucracy, which in normal times would exercise a certain degree of independence," said Thompson. "The relationship between the central government and the provinces is very different than the federal government and states [in the US]. In particular, Chinese provinces are, in financial terms, relatively less dependent on the central government compared to the US system. Certainly, central government funds flow to provinces and disaster areas in the event of a crisis, but those are ad hoc arrangements, rather than systematic, long-term budgetary relationships."
Here are just a few of the many recommendations (edited and abridged) that appear in the ADB report:
1. A National Disaster Management Authorized Agency (NDMAA) needs to be established with sufficient power at the national level, and similar emergency management agencies should be established at provincial and local levels. The NDMAA should adopt what is known as an "all hazards" approach under a steering committee composed of relevant ministers chaired by a top leader of the country.
2. Besides a National Disaster Management Operations Center under the NDMAA, a disaster management operations center should be established in each of six regions, along with a sophisticated and reliable network for activating and sustaining effective inter-provincial and intra-provincial command, control and coordination.
3. A comprehensive national law on disaster risk management must emerge which will also provide a legal basis for the establishment of the NDMAA, related committees and regional operation centers. Disaster risk management must rise to a higher level of priority, and, ongoing governmental and fiscal support for this and other related activities must be maintained in a stable, responsible and predictable manner over time.
4. An action plan for implementing the “National Plan for Comprehensive Disaster Reduction during the ‘Eleventh Five-Year Plan’ period of the People’s Republic of China" needs to be urgently developed, and disaster risk reduction needs to be mainstreamed into the development cycle at all levels.
5. A public-private partnership must emerge to collectively address the process of spreading disaster risk, and a flexible and responsive insurance compensation system should be established with the support and approval of the government, and the insurance sector.
"The Chinese government has made great efforts to reduce the risks and consequences of natural disasters. And yet, it is clearly aware that inadequacies exist that need to be addressed immediately," the white paper said.
Besides coordination and integration of relief efforts, laws and regulations concerning disaster reduction as well as related policies need to be improved. An effective disaster monitoring system is evolving, but it is not in place and operating in 2009. Support for the construction of disaster-resistant or reinforced infrastructure is lacking, and finally, public awareness needs to be enhanced, according to the white paper.
"As natural disasters pose a common challenge to mankind, disaster reduction is a global effort. China will continue to work unremittingly to reduce the risks and damage posed by natural disasters together with the rest of the world for the development and progress of human society," the white paper said.
Andrew Maskrey, the lead author of the new United Nations report -"Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction" - which was released in mid-May told the New York Times that China has not adequately addressed the surge in population in its coastal zone, and that China "has not yet developed the institutional mechanisms to reduce the risk that entails." [2]
China seems to take Maskrey's comments in stride and, for example, had already proceeded to highlight the uncertainty surrounding the seemingly unavoidable impact of climate change in its white paper.
"Now and for a fairly long time to come, the risks of extreme weather phenomena are increasing along with global climate changes. The probability of strong and extra-strong typhoons, tempests and other disasters is quite high," said the white paper.
Many of the goals and objectives that are spelled out in the white paper and ADB report will take at least two to three years to achieve, if not longer. Allocating sufficient funds, applying talented and well-managed human resources, and, maintaining a suitable momentum across multiple organizations, associations and communities will remain a huge challenge for China. Accomplishing this vital undertaking cannot be done simply by governmental decree alone.
Notes
1. 'Coordinate disaster response' China Daily.
2. Studies Tie Disaster Risk to Urban Growth The New York Times. May 16, 2009.
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA. His related commentaries primarily on emergency communications have appeared in the Washington Times, Journal of Emergency Management and Disaster Medicine & Public Health Preparedness, a journal of the American Medical Association. He is a contributor to Asia Times Online.
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China plans for the next big disaster
By Peter J Brown
On the day before the first anniversary of the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, China's Information Office of the State Council released a white paper entitled, "China's Actions for Disaster Prevention and Reduction". According to the white paper, frequent natural disasters in China and around the world have caused enormous losses of life and property.
"China is one of the countries in the world that suffers the most natural disasters," said the white paper. "Always placing people first, the Chinese government has all along put the security of people's lives and property on the top of its work, and has listed the disaster prevention and reduction in its economic and social development plan as an important guarantee of sustainable development."
In Section II of the white paper - "Strategic Goals and Tasks for Disaster Reduction" - the government clearly stated that one main objective is, "to strengthen the state capacity for emergency rescue and relief work. A coordinated and efficient disaster emergency management system will be built, characterized by unified command, sound coordination, clear division of work and level-by-level control with local authorities playing the main role. This will form, by and large, an emergency relief system covering all aspects."
A formal assessment of China's emergency response and recovery efforts following last year's earthquake was issued in December under the auspices of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with assistance from the Bangkok-based Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. The ADB report, "People's Republic of China: Providing Emergency Response to Sichuan Earthquake" is much longer - almost 200 pages - and, in many respects, more comprehensive and candid than the Chinese government's official white paper.
To get a complete picture, one must read both the white paper and the ADB report. When it comes to describing the current state of disaster response, mitigation and preparedness in China, the ADB report addresses real world concerns and looming gaps in China's approach to disaster response and emergency management from the national to the provincial, and on down to the grassroots level. Prepared for China's Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), it documents numerous deficiencies and organizational problems at all levels.
"There are few established comprehensive training strategies and programs, and coordinated multi-sectoral needs analyses, essential for the development of appropriate curricula and associated training materials, have not been undertaken. There is a lack of standards for disaster risk management training, and there is also no independent monitoring structure for the evaluation of disaster risk management training materials and activities," said the ADB report.
Contrast these observations with the following comments in the government's white paper.
"Classes on disaster emergency management for leading officials at the provincial level and classes on unexpected incidents emergency management for officials at the provincial and ministerial level have been held," said the white paper. "Since 2005, special training in disaster emergency management for civil servants has been actively carried out, which has effectively helped to improve the overall quality and ability of disaster emergency management personnel at various levels in preventing and dealing with natural disasters and other unexpected incidents."
One immediately detects a different tone in the ADB report, and a more direct message that cannot be ignored. The white paper paints a more optimistic picture, while the ADB report simply tries to be more realistic.
"It is vital that the plans are regularly improved and updated, and that drills are carried out to practice and test the plans. Moreover, a number of contingency plans are not practical enough, and there are too many conflicts between them, both vertically and horizontally," the ADB report stated.
According to the ADB report, the official death toll as a result of the Sichuan earthquake - the strongest earthquake in China in nearly 60 years - was 69,227 with 17,923 people missing, and 374,643 people injured. More than 46 million people were affected.
Sadly, lessons learned after the huge Tangshan earthquake of 1976 were never heeded, according to the ADB report.
"Most of the people did not know that an earthquake on this scale could occur in the area; and they did not have knowledge and measures which could be adopted to protect themselves and their families before and during the earthquake," stated the ADB report.
Besides the need for appropriate house and building design and construction practices - the terrible tragedy which cost thousands of young lives resulting from collapsed school buildings last year is a very sad and heated subject unto itself will not be discussed here - some of the other forgotten lessons from the 1976 earthquake which claimed approximately 240,000 lives included the fact that no suitably empowered disaster management agency was established in China, and there were so few properly trained and equipped rescue personnel despite "more than 100,000 troops [who] participated in rescue activities during the disaster".
China has changed a lot since then, however. Whereas China's borders were sealed before and after the Tangshan earthquake struck, in 2008 China was thankful for all the relief supplies that poured in from other countries along with trained rescue personnel and relief workers. China continues to express its gratitude for this aid.
Earth observation satellites operated by European, North American and other space agencies immediately started to gather and share satellite imagery of the impacted zone as part of a broad multinational space mobilization under the International Charter "Space and Major Disasters" which was activated by the National Disaster Reduction Center of China.
China has requested satellite flyovers on various occasions under the Charter since 2005, following massive floods in particular. A request for foreign satellites to survey Chinese territory under any circumstance would have been completely out of the question 32 years ago.
As part of a so-called system for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the Military Training and Arms Department of the General Staff Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) also announced in May the formation of five specialized PLA units which will be ready to respond to floods, earthquakes, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents, transportation sector-related disasters, and, international peacekeeping and disaster relief activities.
"In general, all of the Chinese armed forces, the PLA active and reserve forces, People's Armed Police Force, and militia, routinely take part in disaster relief operations in China. Disaster relief training has been incorporated in the PLAs official training program since 2002," said Dennis Blasko, author of The Chinese Army Today (Routledge, 2006), and a former US army attache in Beijing and Hong Kong during the 1990s. "The PLA's MOOTW system looks to me like the PLA is trying to codify lessons learned from all their recent experience and organize and train forces to be able to respond more rapidly and effectively in the future."
A total of 19 PLA engineering units have been assigned to flood response duties along all of China's major rivers since 1998, according to Blasko. During last year's relief efforts in Sichuan, active duty PLA forces from all services - army, navy, air force, and second artillery - and from all seven military regions were deployed in Sichuan and surrounding areas with many forces staying several months.
"This massive deployment revealed many shortcomings in the force which China has readily admitted to in the media even as the troops provided important support to the local government," said Blasko. "However, you would be wrong to assume that the PLA somehow dominates China's large-scale emergency management system. The PLA and other elements of the armed forces provide manpower and specialized assistance when requested. At all levels of government, military officials take part in the meetings on local and national security, but they are part of a large group of government and [Communist] Party officials that make these decisions."
China recognized that things had to be improved years ago. An article in the China Daily in January 2007, for example, described the forthcoming National Programs of Comprehensive Disaster Reduction, under the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10).
"Unlike the National Disaster Reduction Program of China (1998-2010), which emphasized principles, the new programs focus on information-sharing, coordinating ministry-level disaster prevention efforts, and increasing public awareness of how to respond to disasters." [1]
Still, at a meeting last September attended by the team preparing the ADB report and several representatives from various government agencies and others in Gansu province, local and provincial authorities along with ordinary citizens where everyone was encouraged to share their opinions, one sees that very little progress had been made.
Some attendees, "provided different opinions on the existing [governmental response], and recognized that [it] was not effective enough, particularly in the initial phase after the earthquake occurred. The group recognized that united leadership under the government was crucial, however, the Provincial Committee for Disaster Reduction was not able to fully exercise its important and key roles before, during and after the disaster, as its role is restricted to coordination and it does not have the power that it needs to undertake the broader role," the ADB report stated.
The attendees in Gansu then went on to describe "a series of problems on command, coordination and information dissemination during the disaster response and relief [efforts] ... There was no advanced equipment for disaster emergency response, such as satellite mobile phones, movable command vehicles and rescue tools. This affected relief activities significantly in the critical early stages of the disaster," the ADB report stated.
Another problem is that the individual offices responsible for disaster relief do not in and of themselves have the clout they need, nor are they set up to have it, according to Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at The Nixon Center in Washington, DC. Those offices play a coordinating function and are embedded within the MCA, which is supposed to provide the political clout.
"When a crisis occurs, there is a classification system that designates what level of political leader is in charge in the event of a disaster. That leader brings the clout and is expected to mobilize the different branches of the bureaucracy, which in normal times would exercise a certain degree of independence," said Thompson. "The relationship between the central government and the provinces is very different than the federal government and states [in the US]. In particular, Chinese provinces are, in financial terms, relatively less dependent on the central government compared to the US system. Certainly, central government funds flow to provinces and disaster areas in the event of a crisis, but those are ad hoc arrangements, rather than systematic, long-term budgetary relationships."
Here are just a few of the many recommendations (edited and abridged) that appear in the ADB report:
1. A National Disaster Management Authorized Agency (NDMAA) needs to be established with sufficient power at the national level, and similar emergency management agencies should be established at provincial and local levels. The NDMAA should adopt what is known as an "all hazards" approach under a steering committee composed of relevant ministers chaired by a top leader of the country.
2. Besides a National Disaster Management Operations Center under the NDMAA, a disaster management operations center should be established in each of six regions, along with a sophisticated and reliable network for activating and sustaining effective inter-provincial and intra-provincial command, control and coordination.
3. A comprehensive national law on disaster risk management must emerge which will also provide a legal basis for the establishment of the NDMAA, related committees and regional operation centers. Disaster risk management must rise to a higher level of priority, and, ongoing governmental and fiscal support for this and other related activities must be maintained in a stable, responsible and predictable manner over time.
4. An action plan for implementing the “National Plan for Comprehensive Disaster Reduction during the ‘Eleventh Five-Year Plan’ period of the People’s Republic of China" needs to be urgently developed, and disaster risk reduction needs to be mainstreamed into the development cycle at all levels.
5. A public-private partnership must emerge to collectively address the process of spreading disaster risk, and a flexible and responsive insurance compensation system should be established with the support and approval of the government, and the insurance sector.
"The Chinese government has made great efforts to reduce the risks and consequences of natural disasters. And yet, it is clearly aware that inadequacies exist that need to be addressed immediately," the white paper said.
Besides coordination and integration of relief efforts, laws and regulations concerning disaster reduction as well as related policies need to be improved. An effective disaster monitoring system is evolving, but it is not in place and operating in 2009. Support for the construction of disaster-resistant or reinforced infrastructure is lacking, and finally, public awareness needs to be enhanced, according to the white paper.
"As natural disasters pose a common challenge to mankind, disaster reduction is a global effort. China will continue to work unremittingly to reduce the risks and damage posed by natural disasters together with the rest of the world for the development and progress of human society," the white paper said.
Andrew Maskrey, the lead author of the new United Nations report -"Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction" - which was released in mid-May told the New York Times that China has not adequately addressed the surge in population in its coastal zone, and that China "has not yet developed the institutional mechanisms to reduce the risk that entails." [2]
China seems to take Maskrey's comments in stride and, for example, had already proceeded to highlight the uncertainty surrounding the seemingly unavoidable impact of climate change in its white paper.
"Now and for a fairly long time to come, the risks of extreme weather phenomena are increasing along with global climate changes. The probability of strong and extra-strong typhoons, tempests and other disasters is quite high," said the white paper.
Many of the goals and objectives that are spelled out in the white paper and ADB report will take at least two to three years to achieve, if not longer. Allocating sufficient funds, applying talented and well-managed human resources, and, maintaining a suitable momentum across multiple organizations, associations and communities will remain a huge challenge for China. Accomplishing this vital undertaking cannot be done simply by governmental decree alone.
Notes
1. 'Coordinate disaster response' China Daily.
2. Studies Tie Disaster Risk to Urban Growth The New York Times. May 16, 2009.
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA. His related commentaries primarily on emergency communications have appeared in the Washington Times, Journal of Emergency Management and Disaster Medicine & Public Health Preparedness, a journal of the American Medical Association. He is a contributor to Asia Times Online.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29994.1
Thursday, May 28, 2009
China drawn into Myanmar's border strife
May 28, 2009
China drawn into Myanmar's border strife
By Brian McCartan
CHIANG MAI and BANGKOK, Thailand - While the world concentrates on the trial of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi for violating the terms of her house arrest, another drama is playing out on Myanmar's northern border with China. Here the junta is bullying ethnic ceasefire groups into transforming their armies into border guard militias in a move that threatens to plunge the north back into civil war. Beijing is avoiding involvement in the Suu Kyi drama, but in northern Myanmar, it has no choice.
On April 28, simultaneous meetings were held between Myanmar military commanders and representatives of every major ethnic ceasefire army in the north and northeast of the country.
In Myitkyina, Brigadier General Soe Win, the Northern Command commander met with leaders of the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/A), and the National Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K). The Shan State Army (North) (SSA-N) met with Major General Aung Than Htut, Northeastern Command commander, in Lashio, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) met with Brigadier General Win Maung and meetings were held with the National Democratic Alliance Army (Eastern Shan State) (NDAA-ESS). Most importantly, Lieutenant-General Ye Myint met with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Tangyan, eastern Shan State.
The ethnic insurgents were all given the same three options: surrender, become a border guard force under the Myanmar army, or elderly leaders must retire and establish a political party to contest the 2010 elections.
Under the military regime's plan as outlined to the groups on April 28, the ethnic armies would be incorporated into the Myanmar army as a border guard force in their respective areas. Each group must submit a full inventory of manpower, weapons and units and a list of members who would be retired.
Battalions would be set at 326 men and officers with at least 30 coming from the Myanmar army. Command of each battalion would be split between two ethnic officers and one army officer. The military says it will assume responsibility for salaries and benefits on the same level as regular soldiers. A six-month time frame was given for the transformation. Three levels of committees which would oversee the process are dominated by senior Myanmar army officers with almost no participation by ethnic insurgent officers.
Ethnic representatives said they would have to consult their respective leaderships to which the Myanmar officers gave an end of June deadline for a reply.
On May 20, the UWSA rejected Ye Myint's proposal, saying they would prefer to maintain their current ceasefire status, although they would consider the idea in the future. Myanmar-watchers believe that the other groups will follow the UWSA's lead and the MNDAA, NDAA and SSA-N have reportedly rejected the proposal.
The ceasefire groups say that although this is a change from the previous demands for "exchanging arms for peace", it is still not enough.
At issue for the ethnic groups is the lack of guarantees for autonomy in their areas under Myanmar's new constitution approved in a controversial May 2008 referendum. Although the constitution allots six townships to be designated as Wa Self-Administered Divisions, Bao Youxiang, chairman of the UWSA, said in a speech on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of his organization on April 17, "The government of Myanmar has finally enfranchised the Wa ethnic region with the status of an autonomous prefecture, which doesn't fully satisfy our request."
The Wa have been using the term "Wa government" in their official documents since late 2008, but the junta has yet to respond to a Wa request to review the constitution and identify the area as the Wa State government special region.
The Kachin groups have claimed in the past that they will not give up their arms since their demands for autonomy for Kachin State were ignored during the national convention which drafted the new constitution. A Kachin State Progressive Party was formed earlier this year separate from the KIO/A and NDA-K to contest the 2010 elections.
Handing over control of their armed wings to the Myanmar army would separate them from the political leadership - a move that finds little support in an area where power often comes from the barrel of a gun. After over 40 years of armed struggle, none of the groups is keen to relinquish the armed forces which they see as protecting the areas for which that they have fought so hard. It could also mean losing control over the lucrative trade in timber, jade, gems, drugs and arms.
Reports from Shan State and Kachin State reported by the exile Shan Herald Agency for News and the Kachin News Group indicate that there is little support for the junta's proposal. For many it is seen as a total disregard for the ethnic groups' calls for greater autonomy and democracy - the two issues that sparked the insurgency in northern Myanmar in the first place.
The threat of a resumption of hostilities in northern and northeastern Myanmar is no small affair and many of the groups have been preparing for that eventuality. The KIO/A claims to have 20,000 soldiers as well as a militia and sources close to the Kachin say there has been increased recruitment and training in recent years. The NDAA, MNDAA and SSA-N each have several thousand men under arms.
The UWSA is by far the largest ethnic army in Myanmar with some 25,000 men. It has acquired more sophisticated weapons - much of it from China - including, according to a March 2008 Jane's Intelligence Review report, anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles such as the Chinese HN-5N. Sources close to the Wa say that they have also acquired 120mm howitzers and 130mm field artillery and training from the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in how to use them.
In a move for self-sufficiency, the Wa have even established an arms and ammunition manufacturing plant in their territory. Weapons have become so plentiful they the group has apparently been acting as brokers or selling directly to other insurgent groups in Myanmar and in northeastern India.
Tensions have already been growing between the government and the ceasefire groups. Relations between the two suffered a heavy blow when Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, the former spy chief and architect of the ceasefires, was arrested in 2004 and his military intelligence apparatus largely dismantled. In December 2008, Major General Kyaw Phyoe, the Golden Triangle commander in Myanmar's northeast, ordered the UWSA to disarm. The Wa ignored the order and in January forced Ye Myint and his delegation to disarm before entering Wa territory to hold discussions with the UWSA.
China is Myanmar's biggest supporter, but it is also highly influential with the ceasefire groups in northern and northeastern Myanmar. None of the groups would survive long without China's patronage. China's relations with many of the groups go back to its support of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) in the 1970s. Beijing later cut off its support for the BCP in the 1980s, a situation that contributed to the 1989 mutiny that saw the dissolution of the BCP and the formation of many of the present ethnic armies including the UWSA, MNDAA and NDAA.
Concern over the stability of Myanmar and its military regime as well as the reality that the successor groups to the BCP as well as the KIA control most of the Myanmar-China border led Beijing to maintain ties with the groups. For the ethnic organizations, this has meant access to Chinese weaponry as well as Chinese development aid and investment in roads, hydropower projects, agricultural projects and cross-border trade.
What the groups provide in exchange is a buffer zone from possible instability as a result of the policies of Myanmar's erratic rulers. In addition, the UWSA and other groups which have become notorious for narcotics production and trafficking, have agreed to ban opium cultivation in their territories and curb the heroin trade to China. Instead, much of the heroin and methamphetamines they produce is transported to Thailand and increasingly to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
Beijing, however, has also moved closer to Myanmar's military rulers once it became clear in the early 1980s that a communist takeover was not likely. China has become Myanmar's greatest arms supplier and has blocked attempts by Western countries to bring the Myanmar issue before the United Nations Security Council. Despite growing international furor over the arrest and continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, Beijing has made it clear it does not want to get involved.
Yet, this support is not absolute. Following the crackdown on demonstrators in 2007, China encouraged Myanmar's generals to move toward national reconciliation. In December 2008, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi urged Myanmar's ruler, Senior General Than Shwe, to honor the UN's request for an inclusive political process. Most recently, during a visit by Myanmar General Tin Aye to China in April, PLA chief of staff Chen Bingde told him China hoped its southern neighbor could attain stability, economic development and national reconciliation.
In addition, say some analysts of the China-Myanmar border, Beijing is waiting to see which way US policy will go on Myanmar. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in February that there would be a review of US policy on Myanmar.
Under the George W Bush administration, there was increased interest in the plight of Myanmar's ethnic groups. Several members of the US Congress protested at the gross human-rights abuses committed by the Myanmar army in the border areas against ethnic civilians, especially after a report by the Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) detailing the systematic use of rape in Shan State by the Myanmar army was released in 2001.
American aid to refugee camps and programs along the Thai-Myanmar border was increased. Ethnic representatives were brought to the US to brief members of congress and Charm Tong, chairwoman of SWAN, met with Bush in 2005. Should the US decide to provide more support to the ethnic groups, China may want to continue or even increase its support as a counterbalance.
Shan State, however, remains problematic for the US due to the drug trade. In 2005, the US Justice Department indicted several leaders of the UWSA, including offering a US$2 million reward for Wei Hsueh-Kang, perhaps Myanmar's most notorious drug trafficker. The State Department's annual report on narcotics trafficking in 2008 said the UWSA remained the dominant heroin trafficking group in the region and the Treasury Department in November called the UWSA the most powerful drug trafficking organization in Southeast Asia. The US has rejected several previous proposals from groups in Shan State, including the UWSA, going back to 1973 to exchange an end to the drug trade for assistance against the government and development aid.
Beijing's influence over the ceasefire groups means, should it decide it is in its best interests, it could force them to acquiesce to the junta's demands, transform their armies into border militias and join the electoral process. This, however, is not likely to happen as China's interests for the moment are better served by keeping the status quo.
China's main interest is stability in Myanmar that allows its strategic and economic interests to remain unthreatened. In addition to its economic activities in the ethnic ceasefire areas, China has become intensely involved in mining and last year beat out India for the 30-year rights to an oil and gas concession off Myanmar's southwestern coast.
Of perhaps more importance is Myanmar's strategic position as a gateway for trade from China's remote Yunnan province and as a transit point for oil and gas through a recently agreed pipeline project that will allow China to receive oil and gas without having to send its tankers through the easily blocked Malacca Straits.
The greatest threat to those interests would be the resumption of civil war in northern Myanmar, which would result in the destruction of border trade zones, the creation of a huge refugee population and the blockage of important routes for trade, natural resources and the new oil and gas pipeline. Most Myanmar analysts believe that any attempt by the government to force the ceasefire groups to surrender or put their military wings under the control of the Myanmar army would be met with force.
The May 20 decision of the UWSA to reject the proposal would not likely have been made without consultation with the Chinese and this creates a dilemma for Myanmar's generals. Should they force the ceasefire groups to obey and risk renewed fighting and angering China, or back off on one of the key steps on the roadmap to democracy?
Ye Myint has offered to return to UWSA headquarters at Panghsang on the Chinese border to discuss the matter further. The Wa have apparently accepted the offer, but a date has yet to be set.
Brian McCartan is a freelance journalist based in Chiang Mai, Thailand.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29990.1
China drawn into Myanmar's border strife
By Brian McCartan
CHIANG MAI and BANGKOK, Thailand - While the world concentrates on the trial of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi for violating the terms of her house arrest, another drama is playing out on Myanmar's northern border with China. Here the junta is bullying ethnic ceasefire groups into transforming their armies into border guard militias in a move that threatens to plunge the north back into civil war. Beijing is avoiding involvement in the Suu Kyi drama, but in northern Myanmar, it has no choice.
On April 28, simultaneous meetings were held between Myanmar military commanders and representatives of every major ethnic ceasefire army in the north and northeast of the country.
In Myitkyina, Brigadier General Soe Win, the Northern Command commander met with leaders of the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/A), and the National Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K). The Shan State Army (North) (SSA-N) met with Major General Aung Than Htut, Northeastern Command commander, in Lashio, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) met with Brigadier General Win Maung and meetings were held with the National Democratic Alliance Army (Eastern Shan State) (NDAA-ESS). Most importantly, Lieutenant-General Ye Myint met with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Tangyan, eastern Shan State.
The ethnic insurgents were all given the same three options: surrender, become a border guard force under the Myanmar army, or elderly leaders must retire and establish a political party to contest the 2010 elections.
Under the military regime's plan as outlined to the groups on April 28, the ethnic armies would be incorporated into the Myanmar army as a border guard force in their respective areas. Each group must submit a full inventory of manpower, weapons and units and a list of members who would be retired.
Battalions would be set at 326 men and officers with at least 30 coming from the Myanmar army. Command of each battalion would be split between two ethnic officers and one army officer. The military says it will assume responsibility for salaries and benefits on the same level as regular soldiers. A six-month time frame was given for the transformation. Three levels of committees which would oversee the process are dominated by senior Myanmar army officers with almost no participation by ethnic insurgent officers.
Ethnic representatives said they would have to consult their respective leaderships to which the Myanmar officers gave an end of June deadline for a reply.
On May 20, the UWSA rejected Ye Myint's proposal, saying they would prefer to maintain their current ceasefire status, although they would consider the idea in the future. Myanmar-watchers believe that the other groups will follow the UWSA's lead and the MNDAA, NDAA and SSA-N have reportedly rejected the proposal.
The ceasefire groups say that although this is a change from the previous demands for "exchanging arms for peace", it is still not enough.
At issue for the ethnic groups is the lack of guarantees for autonomy in their areas under Myanmar's new constitution approved in a controversial May 2008 referendum. Although the constitution allots six townships to be designated as Wa Self-Administered Divisions, Bao Youxiang, chairman of the UWSA, said in a speech on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of his organization on April 17, "The government of Myanmar has finally enfranchised the Wa ethnic region with the status of an autonomous prefecture, which doesn't fully satisfy our request."
The Wa have been using the term "Wa government" in their official documents since late 2008, but the junta has yet to respond to a Wa request to review the constitution and identify the area as the Wa State government special region.
The Kachin groups have claimed in the past that they will not give up their arms since their demands for autonomy for Kachin State were ignored during the national convention which drafted the new constitution. A Kachin State Progressive Party was formed earlier this year separate from the KIO/A and NDA-K to contest the 2010 elections.
Handing over control of their armed wings to the Myanmar army would separate them from the political leadership - a move that finds little support in an area where power often comes from the barrel of a gun. After over 40 years of armed struggle, none of the groups is keen to relinquish the armed forces which they see as protecting the areas for which that they have fought so hard. It could also mean losing control over the lucrative trade in timber, jade, gems, drugs and arms.
Reports from Shan State and Kachin State reported by the exile Shan Herald Agency for News and the Kachin News Group indicate that there is little support for the junta's proposal. For many it is seen as a total disregard for the ethnic groups' calls for greater autonomy and democracy - the two issues that sparked the insurgency in northern Myanmar in the first place.
The threat of a resumption of hostilities in northern and northeastern Myanmar is no small affair and many of the groups have been preparing for that eventuality. The KIO/A claims to have 20,000 soldiers as well as a militia and sources close to the Kachin say there has been increased recruitment and training in recent years. The NDAA, MNDAA and SSA-N each have several thousand men under arms.
The UWSA is by far the largest ethnic army in Myanmar with some 25,000 men. It has acquired more sophisticated weapons - much of it from China - including, according to a March 2008 Jane's Intelligence Review report, anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles such as the Chinese HN-5N. Sources close to the Wa say that they have also acquired 120mm howitzers and 130mm field artillery and training from the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in how to use them.
In a move for self-sufficiency, the Wa have even established an arms and ammunition manufacturing plant in their territory. Weapons have become so plentiful they the group has apparently been acting as brokers or selling directly to other insurgent groups in Myanmar and in northeastern India.
Tensions have already been growing between the government and the ceasefire groups. Relations between the two suffered a heavy blow when Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, the former spy chief and architect of the ceasefires, was arrested in 2004 and his military intelligence apparatus largely dismantled. In December 2008, Major General Kyaw Phyoe, the Golden Triangle commander in Myanmar's northeast, ordered the UWSA to disarm. The Wa ignored the order and in January forced Ye Myint and his delegation to disarm before entering Wa territory to hold discussions with the UWSA.
China is Myanmar's biggest supporter, but it is also highly influential with the ceasefire groups in northern and northeastern Myanmar. None of the groups would survive long without China's patronage. China's relations with many of the groups go back to its support of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) in the 1970s. Beijing later cut off its support for the BCP in the 1980s, a situation that contributed to the 1989 mutiny that saw the dissolution of the BCP and the formation of many of the present ethnic armies including the UWSA, MNDAA and NDAA.
Concern over the stability of Myanmar and its military regime as well as the reality that the successor groups to the BCP as well as the KIA control most of the Myanmar-China border led Beijing to maintain ties with the groups. For the ethnic organizations, this has meant access to Chinese weaponry as well as Chinese development aid and investment in roads, hydropower projects, agricultural projects and cross-border trade.
What the groups provide in exchange is a buffer zone from possible instability as a result of the policies of Myanmar's erratic rulers. In addition, the UWSA and other groups which have become notorious for narcotics production and trafficking, have agreed to ban opium cultivation in their territories and curb the heroin trade to China. Instead, much of the heroin and methamphetamines they produce is transported to Thailand and increasingly to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
Beijing, however, has also moved closer to Myanmar's military rulers once it became clear in the early 1980s that a communist takeover was not likely. China has become Myanmar's greatest arms supplier and has blocked attempts by Western countries to bring the Myanmar issue before the United Nations Security Council. Despite growing international furor over the arrest and continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, Beijing has made it clear it does not want to get involved.
Yet, this support is not absolute. Following the crackdown on demonstrators in 2007, China encouraged Myanmar's generals to move toward national reconciliation. In December 2008, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi urged Myanmar's ruler, Senior General Than Shwe, to honor the UN's request for an inclusive political process. Most recently, during a visit by Myanmar General Tin Aye to China in April, PLA chief of staff Chen Bingde told him China hoped its southern neighbor could attain stability, economic development and national reconciliation.
In addition, say some analysts of the China-Myanmar border, Beijing is waiting to see which way US policy will go on Myanmar. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in February that there would be a review of US policy on Myanmar.
Under the George W Bush administration, there was increased interest in the plight of Myanmar's ethnic groups. Several members of the US Congress protested at the gross human-rights abuses committed by the Myanmar army in the border areas against ethnic civilians, especially after a report by the Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) detailing the systematic use of rape in Shan State by the Myanmar army was released in 2001.
American aid to refugee camps and programs along the Thai-Myanmar border was increased. Ethnic representatives were brought to the US to brief members of congress and Charm Tong, chairwoman of SWAN, met with Bush in 2005. Should the US decide to provide more support to the ethnic groups, China may want to continue or even increase its support as a counterbalance.
Shan State, however, remains problematic for the US due to the drug trade. In 2005, the US Justice Department indicted several leaders of the UWSA, including offering a US$2 million reward for Wei Hsueh-Kang, perhaps Myanmar's most notorious drug trafficker. The State Department's annual report on narcotics trafficking in 2008 said the UWSA remained the dominant heroin trafficking group in the region and the Treasury Department in November called the UWSA the most powerful drug trafficking organization in Southeast Asia. The US has rejected several previous proposals from groups in Shan State, including the UWSA, going back to 1973 to exchange an end to the drug trade for assistance against the government and development aid.
Beijing's influence over the ceasefire groups means, should it decide it is in its best interests, it could force them to acquiesce to the junta's demands, transform their armies into border militias and join the electoral process. This, however, is not likely to happen as China's interests for the moment are better served by keeping the status quo.
China's main interest is stability in Myanmar that allows its strategic and economic interests to remain unthreatened. In addition to its economic activities in the ethnic ceasefire areas, China has become intensely involved in mining and last year beat out India for the 30-year rights to an oil and gas concession off Myanmar's southwestern coast.
Of perhaps more importance is Myanmar's strategic position as a gateway for trade from China's remote Yunnan province and as a transit point for oil and gas through a recently agreed pipeline project that will allow China to receive oil and gas without having to send its tankers through the easily blocked Malacca Straits.
The greatest threat to those interests would be the resumption of civil war in northern Myanmar, which would result in the destruction of border trade zones, the creation of a huge refugee population and the blockage of important routes for trade, natural resources and the new oil and gas pipeline. Most Myanmar analysts believe that any attempt by the government to force the ceasefire groups to surrender or put their military wings under the control of the Myanmar army would be met with force.
The May 20 decision of the UWSA to reject the proposal would not likely have been made without consultation with the Chinese and this creates a dilemma for Myanmar's generals. Should they force the ceasefire groups to obey and risk renewed fighting and angering China, or back off on one of the key steps on the roadmap to democracy?
Ye Myint has offered to return to UWSA headquarters at Panghsang on the Chinese border to discuss the matter further. The Wa have apparently accepted the offer, but a date has yet to be set.
Brian McCartan is a freelance journalist based in Chiang Mai, Thailand.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29990.1
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
China Must Change Its Economic Model
China Must Change Its Economic Model
by Colum Murphy
Posted May 13, 2009
Charlene Barshefsky, the former United States trade representative (served 1997 - 2001) says China's economic model must change to retain stability in the current recession. She talked to REVIEW deputy editor Colum Murphy about Asia's role in the world economy and attitudes that will benefit China as it moves forward in international trade.
Basically the belief of our contributors was that this global economic crisis was going to have an impact on Asia on several different levels. What do you think will be the impact of this economic crisis on Asia?
I think the effects of this crisis will be many and varied with respect to Asia's fundamental economic model, which is highly export dependent, relying on wealthier countries to spend more and Asia relying on its own population to spend less. This model is no longer viable.
As a global aggregate of savings you have a very few number of countries that spend spend spend and an enormous number of countries that save save save. Those that save and have large surpluses essentially are depending upon a relatively few nations to spend their way into bankruptcy. It's been said for some time that model is inherently unstable and we see today, of course, it is. There is no balance on the spending countries; there is no balance on the savings countries.
Fundamentally, the economic model of both the savers and the spenders must change.
In what way do you see that change manifesting itself?
That model will have to change from export dependency and suppressed domestic consumption to heightened domestic consumption with less reliance on exports for growth. That doesn't mean Asia is going to stop exporting. It does mean that the balance of growth within Asia must and will change and that balance will be effectuated by a diminution in savings and increase in domestic consumption and a corresponding decrease in exports as the sole basis of growth.
Do you think that the government in China is consciously taking steps to move toward more domestic consumption?
Certainly every nation is looking for growth. So what are the sources of growth? For China, it had been (outside) purchases. Those purchases have stopped, so China must look internally for growth. But this is a high savings country in uncertain economic times and a drastic slowdown in China's own economy. So the source of growth is now the government, as it is worldwide; it's stimulus.
You have now trillions and trillions of dollars pumped in globally by governments to stimulate growth, to re-create growth. That growth will largely be retained internally. For China, you will see this increase in domestic growth within China. That alone is unsustainable. There are a variety of ways in which to increase growth generally; that needs to then be translated into the allocation of that stimulus in a manner best directed to promote domestic demand-led growth.
We've already seen greater demands in terms of "buy American" or "buy domestically" so do you see this type of government-led spending could actually lead to an increase in trade protectionism?
I certainly hope not because there is no surer way to reignite global crisis than to see a rapid downturn in trade. We see some protectionist action now by most major countries. The aggregate effect of which, as an economic matter, has been tiny. The larger concern is one does not want to see a mentality develop among governments that it's the foreigners' fault. Number two, one doesn't want to see governments believe that the solution to their problems is to shut trade down or out because this is the way one actually accelerates recessionary conditions. And certainly, one wants to ensure that the WTO remains strong as the organization that can settle trade disputes in a way acceptable both politically and with respect to security.
How would you evaluate the Obama administration in terms of its trade policies toward Asia and its growing calls for protectionism amongst certain sections in Congress, for example?
I worry less about that because I don't see either for the U.S. or globally any fundamental rollback in relatively open trade. Globalization is deeply embedded for every country for the major businesses of every country as an economic matter. Globalization has added extraordinary sums-trillions of dollars-to global wealth on an aggregate basis.
Second of all, many trade agreements around the world-and I daresay most of the free trade agreements around the world-are less economic agreements than they are agreements designed to build and cement alliances. Trade and economics are critical tools for that and I don't see global leadership turning away from that critical tool especially in times of crisis.
What does this crisis mean for Asia and for China?
Certainly China as a country with a large current account surplus and extraordinary foreign exchange reserves has demonstrated already that it is in a more influential position. Do I think that suggests that China is a superpower? No. Do I think China wants to be a superpower at this juncture? No. I think that China is quite focused internally and externally insofar as it helps secure China's internal strength and internal stability. But I do think certainly China, as a re-emerging economy, is doing so at a very impressive rate and I think that is a welcome development for the global economy; not a development, certainly at this juncture, to be feared.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29944.1
by Colum Murphy
Posted May 13, 2009
Charlene Barshefsky, the former United States trade representative (served 1997 - 2001) says China's economic model must change to retain stability in the current recession. She talked to REVIEW deputy editor Colum Murphy about Asia's role in the world economy and attitudes that will benefit China as it moves forward in international trade.
Basically the belief of our contributors was that this global economic crisis was going to have an impact on Asia on several different levels. What do you think will be the impact of this economic crisis on Asia?
I think the effects of this crisis will be many and varied with respect to Asia's fundamental economic model, which is highly export dependent, relying on wealthier countries to spend more and Asia relying on its own population to spend less. This model is no longer viable.
As a global aggregate of savings you have a very few number of countries that spend spend spend and an enormous number of countries that save save save. Those that save and have large surpluses essentially are depending upon a relatively few nations to spend their way into bankruptcy. It's been said for some time that model is inherently unstable and we see today, of course, it is. There is no balance on the spending countries; there is no balance on the savings countries.
Fundamentally, the economic model of both the savers and the spenders must change.
In what way do you see that change manifesting itself?
That model will have to change from export dependency and suppressed domestic consumption to heightened domestic consumption with less reliance on exports for growth. That doesn't mean Asia is going to stop exporting. It does mean that the balance of growth within Asia must and will change and that balance will be effectuated by a diminution in savings and increase in domestic consumption and a corresponding decrease in exports as the sole basis of growth.
Do you think that the government in China is consciously taking steps to move toward more domestic consumption?
Certainly every nation is looking for growth. So what are the sources of growth? For China, it had been (outside) purchases. Those purchases have stopped, so China must look internally for growth. But this is a high savings country in uncertain economic times and a drastic slowdown in China's own economy. So the source of growth is now the government, as it is worldwide; it's stimulus.
You have now trillions and trillions of dollars pumped in globally by governments to stimulate growth, to re-create growth. That growth will largely be retained internally. For China, you will see this increase in domestic growth within China. That alone is unsustainable. There are a variety of ways in which to increase growth generally; that needs to then be translated into the allocation of that stimulus in a manner best directed to promote domestic demand-led growth.
We've already seen greater demands in terms of "buy American" or "buy domestically" so do you see this type of government-led spending could actually lead to an increase in trade protectionism?
I certainly hope not because there is no surer way to reignite global crisis than to see a rapid downturn in trade. We see some protectionist action now by most major countries. The aggregate effect of which, as an economic matter, has been tiny. The larger concern is one does not want to see a mentality develop among governments that it's the foreigners' fault. Number two, one doesn't want to see governments believe that the solution to their problems is to shut trade down or out because this is the way one actually accelerates recessionary conditions. And certainly, one wants to ensure that the WTO remains strong as the organization that can settle trade disputes in a way acceptable both politically and with respect to security.
How would you evaluate the Obama administration in terms of its trade policies toward Asia and its growing calls for protectionism amongst certain sections in Congress, for example?
I worry less about that because I don't see either for the U.S. or globally any fundamental rollback in relatively open trade. Globalization is deeply embedded for every country for the major businesses of every country as an economic matter. Globalization has added extraordinary sums-trillions of dollars-to global wealth on an aggregate basis.
Second of all, many trade agreements around the world-and I daresay most of the free trade agreements around the world-are less economic agreements than they are agreements designed to build and cement alliances. Trade and economics are critical tools for that and I don't see global leadership turning away from that critical tool especially in times of crisis.
What does this crisis mean for Asia and for China?
Certainly China as a country with a large current account surplus and extraordinary foreign exchange reserves has demonstrated already that it is in a more influential position. Do I think that suggests that China is a superpower? No. Do I think China wants to be a superpower at this juncture? No. I think that China is quite focused internally and externally insofar as it helps secure China's internal strength and internal stability. But I do think certainly China, as a re-emerging economy, is doing so at a very impressive rate and I think that is a welcome development for the global economy; not a development, certainly at this juncture, to be feared.
http://forums.delphiforums.com/sunkopitiam/messages?msg=29944.1
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