China drawn into Myanmar's border strife

May 28, 2009

China drawn into Myanmar's border strife
By Brian McCartan

CHIANG MAI and BANGKOK, Thailand - While the world concentrates on the trial of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi for violating the terms of her house arrest, another drama is playing out on Myanmar's northern border with China. Here the junta is bullying ethnic ceasefire groups into transforming their armies into border guard militias in a move that threatens to plunge the north back into civil war. Beijing is avoiding involvement in the Suu Kyi drama, but in northern Myanmar, it has no choice.

On April 28, simultaneous meetings were held between Myanmar military commanders and representatives of every major ethnic ceasefire army in the north and northeast of the country.

In Myitkyina, Brigadier General Soe Win, the Northern Command commander met with leaders of the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/A), and the National Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K). The Shan State Army (North) (SSA-N) met with Major General Aung Than Htut, Northeastern Command commander, in Lashio, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) met with Brigadier General Win Maung and meetings were held with the National Democratic Alliance Army (Eastern Shan State) (NDAA-ESS). Most importantly, Lieutenant-General Ye Myint met with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Tangyan, eastern Shan State.

The ethnic insurgents were all given the same three options: surrender, become a border guard force under the Myanmar army, or elderly leaders must retire and establish a political party to contest the 2010 elections.

Under the military regime's plan as outlined to the groups on April 28, the ethnic armies would be incorporated into the Myanmar army as a border guard force in their respective areas. Each group must submit a full inventory of manpower, weapons and units and a list of members who would be retired.

Battalions would be set at 326 men and officers with at least 30 coming from the Myanmar army. Command of each battalion would be split between two ethnic officers and one army officer. The military says it will assume responsibility for salaries and benefits on the same level as regular soldiers. A six-month time frame was given for the transformation. Three levels of committees which would oversee the process are dominated by senior Myanmar army officers with almost no participation by ethnic insurgent officers.

Ethnic representatives said they would have to consult their respective leaderships to which the Myanmar officers gave an end of June deadline for a reply.

On May 20, the UWSA rejected Ye Myint's proposal, saying they would prefer to maintain their current ceasefire status, although they would consider the idea in the future. Myanmar-watchers believe that the other groups will follow the UWSA's lead and the MNDAA, NDAA and SSA-N have reportedly rejected the proposal.

The ceasefire groups say that although this is a change from the previous demands for "exchanging arms for peace", it is still not enough.

At issue for the ethnic groups is the lack of guarantees for autonomy in their areas under Myanmar's new constitution approved in a controversial May 2008 referendum. Although the constitution allots six townships to be designated as Wa Self-Administered Divisions, Bao Youxiang, chairman of the UWSA, said in a speech on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of his organization on April 17, "The government of Myanmar has finally enfranchised the Wa ethnic region with the status of an autonomous prefecture, which doesn't fully satisfy our request."

The Wa have been using the term "Wa government" in their official documents since late 2008, but the junta has yet to respond to a Wa request to review the constitution and identify the area as the Wa State government special region.

The Kachin groups have claimed in the past that they will not give up their arms since their demands for autonomy for Kachin State were ignored during the national convention which drafted the new constitution. A Kachin State Progressive Party was formed earlier this year separate from the KIO/A and NDA-K to contest the 2010 elections.

Handing over control of their armed wings to the Myanmar army would separate them from the political leadership - a move that finds little support in an area where power often comes from the barrel of a gun. After over 40 years of armed struggle, none of the groups is keen to relinquish the armed forces which they see as protecting the areas for which that they have fought so hard. It could also mean losing control over the lucrative trade in timber, jade, gems, drugs and arms.

Reports from Shan State and Kachin State reported by the exile Shan Herald Agency for News and the Kachin News Group indicate that there is little support for the junta's proposal. For many it is seen as a total disregard for the ethnic groups' calls for greater autonomy and democracy - the two issues that sparked the insurgency in northern Myanmar in the first place.

The threat of a resumption of hostilities in northern and northeastern Myanmar is no small affair and many of the groups have been preparing for that eventuality. The KIO/A claims to have 20,000 soldiers as well as a militia and sources close to the Kachin say there has been increased recruitment and training in recent years. The NDAA, MNDAA and SSA-N each have several thousand men under arms.

The UWSA is by far the largest ethnic army in Myanmar with some 25,000 men. It has acquired more sophisticated weapons - much of it from China - including, according to a March 2008 Jane's Intelligence Review report, anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles such as the Chinese HN-5N. Sources close to the Wa say that they have also acquired 120mm howitzers and 130mm field artillery and training from the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in how to use them.

In a move for self-sufficiency, the Wa have even established an arms and ammunition manufacturing plant in their territory. Weapons have become so plentiful they the group has apparently been acting as brokers or selling directly to other insurgent groups in Myanmar and in northeastern India.

Tensions have already been growing between the government and the ceasefire groups. Relations between the two suffered a heavy blow when Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, the former spy chief and architect of the ceasefires, was arrested in 2004 and his military intelligence apparatus largely dismantled. In December 2008, Major General Kyaw Phyoe, the Golden Triangle commander in Myanmar's northeast, ordered the UWSA to disarm. The Wa ignored the order and in January forced Ye Myint and his delegation to disarm before entering Wa territory to hold discussions with the UWSA.

China is Myanmar's biggest supporter, but it is also highly influential with the ceasefire groups in northern and northeastern Myanmar. None of the groups would survive long without China's patronage. China's relations with many of the groups go back to its support of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) in the 1970s. Beijing later cut off its support for the BCP in the 1980s, a situation that contributed to the 1989 mutiny that saw the dissolution of the BCP and the formation of many of the present ethnic armies including the UWSA, MNDAA and NDAA.

Concern over the stability of Myanmar and its military regime as well as the reality that the successor groups to the BCP as well as the KIA control most of the Myanmar-China border led Beijing to maintain ties with the groups. For the ethnic organizations, this has meant access to Chinese weaponry as well as Chinese development aid and investment in roads, hydropower projects, agricultural projects and cross-border trade.

What the groups provide in exchange is a buffer zone from possible instability as a result of the policies of Myanmar's erratic rulers. In addition, the UWSA and other groups which have become notorious for narcotics production and trafficking, have agreed to ban opium cultivation in their territories and curb the heroin trade to China. Instead, much of the heroin and methamphetamines they produce is transported to Thailand and increasingly to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

Beijing, however, has also moved closer to Myanmar's military rulers once it became clear in the early 1980s that a communist takeover was not likely. China has become Myanmar's greatest arms supplier and has blocked attempts by Western countries to bring the Myanmar issue before the United Nations Security Council. Despite growing international furor over the arrest and continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, Beijing has made it clear it does not want to get involved.

Yet, this support is not absolute. Following the crackdown on demonstrators in 2007, China encouraged Myanmar's generals to move toward national reconciliation. In December 2008, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi urged Myanmar's ruler, Senior General Than Shwe, to honor the UN's request for an inclusive political process. Most recently, during a visit by Myanmar General Tin Aye to China in April, PLA chief of staff Chen Bingde told him China hoped its southern neighbor could attain stability, economic development and national reconciliation.

In addition, say some analysts of the China-Myanmar border, Beijing is waiting to see which way US policy will go on Myanmar. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in February that there would be a review of US policy on Myanmar.

Under the George W Bush administration, there was increased interest in the plight of Myanmar's ethnic groups. Several members of the US Congress protested at the gross human-rights abuses committed by the Myanmar army in the border areas against ethnic civilians, especially after a report by the Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) detailing the systematic use of rape in Shan State by the Myanmar army was released in 2001.

American aid to refugee camps and programs along the Thai-Myanmar border was increased. Ethnic representatives were brought to the US to brief members of congress and Charm Tong, chairwoman of SWAN, met with Bush in 2005. Should the US decide to provide more support to the ethnic groups, China may want to continue or even increase its support as a counterbalance.

Shan State, however, remains problematic for the US due to the drug trade. In 2005, the US Justice Department indicted several leaders of the UWSA, including offering a US$2 million reward for Wei Hsueh-Kang, perhaps Myanmar's most notorious drug trafficker. The State Department's annual report on narcotics trafficking in 2008 said the UWSA remained the dominant heroin trafficking group in the region and the Treasury Department in November called the UWSA the most powerful drug trafficking organization in Southeast Asia. The US has rejected several previous proposals from groups in Shan State, including the UWSA, going back to 1973 to exchange an end to the drug trade for assistance against the government and development aid.

Beijing's influence over the ceasefire groups means, should it decide it is in its best interests, it could force them to acquiesce to the junta's demands, transform their armies into border militias and join the electoral process. This, however, is not likely to happen as China's interests for the moment are better served by keeping the status quo.

China's main interest is stability in Myanmar that allows its strategic and economic interests to remain unthreatened. In addition to its economic activities in the ethnic ceasefire areas, China has become intensely involved in mining and last year beat out India for the 30-year rights to an oil and gas concession off Myanmar's southwestern coast.

Of perhaps more importance is Myanmar's strategic position as a gateway for trade from China's remote Yunnan province and as a transit point for oil and gas through a recently agreed pipeline project that will allow China to receive oil and gas without having to send its tankers through the easily blocked Malacca Straits.

The greatest threat to those interests would be the resumption of civil war in northern Myanmar, which would result in the destruction of border trade zones, the creation of a huge refugee population and the blockage of important routes for trade, natural resources and the new oil and gas pipeline. Most Myanmar analysts believe that any attempt by the government to force the ceasefire groups to surrender or put their military wings under the control of the Myanmar army would be met with force.

The May 20 decision of the UWSA to reject the proposal would not likely have been made without consultation with the Chinese and this creates a dilemma for Myanmar's generals. Should they force the ceasefire groups to obey and risk renewed fighting and angering China, or back off on one of the key steps on the roadmap to democracy?

Ye Myint has offered to return to UWSA headquarters at Panghsang on the Chinese border to discuss the matter further. The Wa have apparently accepted the offer, but a date has yet to be set.

Brian McCartan is a freelance journalist based in Chiang Mai, Thailand.

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